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Abstract
Members of a supply chain often make profit comparisons. A retailer exhibits peer-induced fairness concerns
when his own profit is behind that of a peer retailer interacting with the same supplier. In addition, a retailer
exhibits distributional fairness when his supplier's share of total profit is larger than his own. While existing
research focuses exclusively on distributional fairness concerns, this study investigates how both types of
fairness might interact and influence economic outcomes in a supply chain. We consider a one-supplier and
two-retailer supply chain setting, and we show that (i) in the presence of distributional fairness alone, the
wholesale price offer is lower than the standard wholesale price offer; (ii) in the presence of both types of
fairness, the second wholesale price is higher than the first wholesale price; and (iii) in the presence of both
types of fairness, the second retailer makes a lower profit and has a lower share of the total supply chain profit
than the first retailer. We run controlled experiments with subjects motivated by substantial monetary
incentives and show that subject behaviors are consistent with the model predictions. Structural estimation on
the data suggests that peer-induced fairness is more salient than distributional fairness.
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Members of a supply chain often make proﬁt comparisons. A retailer ex-
hibits peer-induced fairness concerns when his own proﬁt is behind that of a
peer retailer interacting with the same supplier. In addition, a retailer ex-
hibits distributional fairness concerns when his supplier’s share of total proﬁt
is disproportionately larger than his own. While existing research focuses ex-
clusively on distributional fairness concerns, this paper investigates how both
types of fairness concerns might interact and inﬂuence economic outcomes in
a supply chain. We consider a setting where a supplier sells an identical prod-
uct through 2 independent retailers, each serving his own market. The supplier
sequentially oﬀers each retailer a linear wholesale price contract, and each re-
tailer must choose his own retail price if he accepts the supplier’s wholesale
price oﬀer. The second retailer observes a noisy signal of the ﬁrst wholesale
price oﬀer and this information may inﬂuence his decisions. We show that:
(i) the ﬁrst wholesale price oﬀer is lower than the standard wholesale price
oﬀer in the absence of fairness concerns, (ii) the second wholesale price is
higher than the ﬁrst wholesale price, and (iii) the second retailer makes a
lower proﬁt and has a lower share of the total supply chain proﬁt than the
ﬁrst retailer. We run controlled experiments with subjects motivated by sub-
stantial monetary incentives and show that subject behaviors are consistent
with the model predictions. Structural estimation on the data suggests that
peer-induced fairness is more salient than distributional fairness.
Keywords: Distributional Fairness, Peer-induced Fairness, Supply Chain Con-
tracting, Behavioral Operations Management, Behavioral Economics
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1 Introduction
Fairness is a cornerstone in our daily social interactions. We all want to be treated fairly
by our friends and colleagues. This paper studies two types of fairness concerns: distribu-
tional fairness, where people dislike unfavorable shares in a distribution of a total pie, and
peer-induced fairness, where people dislike unfavorable treatment relative to a peer. Peo-
ple tend to penalize unfair behavior even at their own expense. For example, customers
frequently respond to ﬁrms’ price gouging practices by boycotting them, a phenomenon
arising from customers’ distributional fairness concerns (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002). Also, customers are averse to being
behind other customers in terms of economic outcomes because they have peer-induced
fairness concerns (Ho and Su, 2009).
Fairness matters in business-to-business transactions too (Kahneman et. al, 1986, Ander-
son and Weitz, 1992). A retailer who feels that his supplier prices unfairly may retaliate
by raising retail price in order to reduce the supplier’s share of the total channel surplus.
Likewise, a retailer who has a good guess of what a peer retailer’s wholesale price oﬀer
may compare his proﬁt with that of the peer retailer and adjust his retail price in order
not to be behind. To the best of our knowledge, there is no research investigating the
interaction between the two kinds of fairness in the design of supply chain contracts.
This paper considers a 1-supplier and 2-retailers supply chain and investigates, both
theoretically and experimentally, the role of distributional and peer-induced fairness in
supply chain contract design. We ﬁrst analyze how distributional fairness aﬀects both
wholesale and retail prices between a supplier and a retailer. As shown extensively in
the experimental and behavioral economics literature, a seller who demands a higher
proportion of a ﬁxed pie by charging a take-or-leave-it ultimatum price oﬀer is frequently
rejected and penalized by a buyer. While the standard ultimatum game may capture
a business-to-customer retail market well, the game fails to capture the reality of the
strategic interaction between members of a supply chain. This is because even in the
simplest possible 1-supplier and 1-retailer supply chain, the size of the pie is not ex-
ogenously ﬁxed but determined by the retailer through his retail price decision. In this
paper, we analyze how optimal wholesale and retail prices change when the retailer is
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allowed to have distributional fairness concerns.
We then extend the model by introducing peer-induced fairness in a 1-supplier and 2-
retailer supply chain where the supplier must determine his wholesale price oﬀers to 2
retailers sequentially. First, the supplier oﬀers a wholesale price contract to the ﬁrst
retailer. Then, the second retailer observes an imperfect signal of the ﬁrst wholesale
price oﬀer. Finally, the supplier makes a wholesale price oﬀer to the second retailer.
In this setup, the second retailer’s willingness to accept the contract may depend on
what he thinks the ﬁrst retailer received. As a result of peer-induced fairness concerns,
the optimal wholesale and retail prices may change. The general model analyzes these
changes and their accompanying implications on retailer’s proﬁtability and share of the
total channel surplus.
Our general model predicts that distributional fairness results in a lower wholesale price
oﬀer by the supplier. In addition, the model predicts that the second retailer receives a
higher wholesale price oﬀer and receives a lower proﬁt than the ﬁrst retailer. One might
expect the reverse result since the supplier may wish to allay the second retailer’s peer-
induced fairness concerns. However, we show the contrary. The supplier increases the
wholesale price oﬀer to the second retailer, because the latter must choose a retail price
to balance the opposing forces of not being behind the supplier and not being behind the
ﬁrst retailer.
We conduct economic experiments with subjects motivated by substantial monetary in-
centives and show that subjects’ behaviors are consistent with the model’s main pre-
dictions. In addition, we structurally estimate our model with the experimental data
and ﬁnd that both distributional and peer-induced fairness are important in describing
subjects’ behaviors. In addition, peer-induced fairness appears more salient than distri-
butional fairness in determining subjects’ behaviors.
There has been growing behavioral research in operations management in recent years
(Loch and Wu 2007). Decision biases, such as reference dependence and loss aversion
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979), have been extensively studied in the context of supply
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chain contracting (e.g., Lim and Ho 2007; Ho and Zhang 2008; Su 2008; Katok and
Wu 2009; Ho et al. 2010, Kalkanci et al. 2011). While this stream of literature ﬁnds
boundedly rational decision-makers fail to make the optimal decisions predicted by stan-
dard models, research on social preferences shows both positive eﬀects of fairness and
reciprocity on performance (Cui et al. 2007, Loch and Wu 2008, Wu et al. 2011) and
negative eﬀects of social comparison among peers in making inventory decisions (Avci
et al. 2012). Distributional fairness between retailer and supplier has been shown, both
theoretically and experimentally, to contribute signiﬁcantly to coordination failures and
eﬃciency loss in supply chains, in particular when supply chain members are not fully
informed of other members’ fairness concerns (Katok et al. 2012, Katok and Pavlov 2012,
Pavlov and Katok 2012).
Most existing research, however, has not addressed behavioral issues beyond a simple
supply chain dyad (for an exception, see Ho et al. 2010). This research investigates social
preferences in a 1-supplier and 2-retailer supply chain. This paper distinguishes from the
above behavioral studies by making three contributions:
1. This research is the ﬁrst to theoretically investigate the interaction between distri-
butional and peer-induced fairness in a 1-supplier and 2-retailer supply chain. Our
theoretical result that the second retailer who has peer-induced concerns receives
a higher wholesale price and a lower proﬁt is new and surprising.
2. We test our general model in economic experiments with ﬁnancially motivated sub-
jects. Our experimental results support the model’s main predictions. Speciﬁcally,
we show that: (i) the ﬁrst retailer’s wholesale price oﬀer is lower than the standard
“no-fairness” benchmark, (ii) the second retailer’s wholesale price oﬀer is higher
than that of the ﬁrst retailer, and (iii) the second retailer makes a smaller proﬁt
and receives a lower share of the total pie than the ﬁrst retailer.
3. We structurally estimate our model and show that both distributional and peer-
induced fairness parameters are signiﬁcant and important in describing actual be-
haviors. Since the standard model (without fairness) is nested as as special case,
our approach can formally quantify the role of fairness in price contract design.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model, the model with
distributional fairness, and the general model with both distributional and peer-induced
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fairness. We prove three propositions about wholesale price oﬀers and retailer’s proﬁtabil-
ity and formulate them into 3 testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the experimental
design and procedure. Section 4 reports summary statistics of the experimental data,
provides statistical tests of the three hypotheses, and estimates the model structurally.
Section 5 provides an in-depth interpretation of the estimated structural models. Sec-
tion 6 discusses managerial implications of the results. Section 7 concludes and suggests
future research directions.
2 Model Formulation
2.1 Notations
Let us begin with some notation. The general model will analyze a supply chain with
three players: Supplier (denoted by S) and Retailers 1 and 2 (denoted as R1 and R2
respectively). The supplier sells an identical product through the two retailers. The
retailers operate in two separate markets, and have the same but independent demand
curve as: di = a − pi, i = 1, 2. The supplier has a constant marginal cost c, where
0 < c < a. The supplier determines wholesale price oﬀers in sequence, with w1 (oﬀer to
R1) preceding w2 (oﬀer to R2). If a retailer i accepts the supplier’s wholesale price oﬀer,
he must set a retailer price pi accordingly in order to maximize his utility.
In the next 3 subsections, we consider 3 increasingly general versions of the model.
We ﬁrst study a basic model with no fairness concerns, followed by a model with only
distributional fairness concerns, and then ﬁnally the full model with both distributional
and peer-induced fairness concerns. We refer to them as Models I, II and III respectively.
2.2 Model I: No Fairness
In the basic model, we consider a supplier and a retailer i dyad. Here, the proﬁt function
of retailer i is given by πi(pi) = di · (pi − wi) = (a− pi) · (pi − wi). The supplier’s proﬁt
is given by πS,i(wi) = di · (wi − c) = (a − pi) · (wi − c). Conditional on a wholesale
price oﬀer wi, retailer i’s best response function is pi(wi) =
a+wi
2
. Substituting this best
response function into the supplier’s proﬁt function, we have πS,i(wi) =
a−wi
2
· (wi − c)
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which is maximized by choosing woi =
a+c
2
. Retailer i’s optimal retail price is then given
by poi =
a+woi
2
= 3a+c
4
. Furthermore, in equilibrium, retailer i earns πoi =
(a−c)2
16
, and the
supplier earns πoS,i =
(a−c)2
8
. Note that the supplier makes twice as much proﬁt as the
retailer in the basic model. That is, the supplier enjoys 2
3
and the retailer enjoys 1
3
of the
total channel proﬁt.
2.3 Model II: Distributional Fairness
We now extend the basic model to allow retailer i to have distributional fairness concerns.
Speciﬁcally, the retailer cares not only about his own proﬁt, but also his proﬁt relative
to the supplier’s proﬁt. As a consequence, the retailer i incurs a disutility of making less
than the supplier. Retailer i’s revised utility is modeled as follows
ui =
{
πi − δ ·max{πS,i − πi, 0}, if Accept
0 if Reject
(2.1)
where δ ≥ 0 is the distributional fairness parameter.1 Note that when δ = 0, ui = πi the
model reduces back to the basic model.
Proposition 1 characterizes the optimal wholesale and retail prices at equilibrium:
Proposition 1. Conditional on a wholesale price oﬀer wi, the retailer i’s best-response
retail price is as follows:
pi =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
a+wi
2
+ δ(wi−c)
2(1+δ)
, if wi ≥ a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ
2wi − c, a+2c3 ≤ wi < a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ
a+wi
2
, if wi <
a+2c
3
(2.2)
Applying backward induction, the supplier’s optimal wholesale price is given by
w∗i =
{
a+c
2
− δ(a−c)
2(1+2δ)
, if δ < 1
7
a+2c
3
, otherwise
(2.3)
As a consequence, the optimal retail price is
p∗i =
{
3a+c
4
, if δ < 1
7
2a+c
3
, otherwise
(2.4)
1Since the supplier makes more money in the basic model, the retailer is always behind the supplier
in terms of proﬁtability.
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Note that when distributional fairness parameter δ < 1
7
, the optimal wholesale price is
smaller than that of the basic model but the retail price remains unchanged at 3a+c
4
(see
Cui et. al 2007 for a related model). As a consequence, the total channel surplus remains
the same but the retailer now enjoys a higher share of the surplus when compared to the
basic model. When δ ≥ 1
7
, both the wholesale and retail prices are smaller than those in
the basic model. In this case, the total channel surplus becomes larger than that in the
basic model.
The same prediction should carry through when the supplier is faced with two indepen-
dent retailers (with an identical demand function) as long as the supplier’s wholesale
price oﬀers are made simultaneously and no retailer observes any signal of other retailer’s
oﬀer. This is so because the supplier will make an identical oﬀer to both retailers and
there will not be any peer-induced fairness between them. Hence w∗1 = w
∗
2 = w
∗
i .
2.4 Model III: Distributional and Peer-induced Fairness
We now consider a supply chain with 1 supplier and 2 retailers. The order of events is
as follows. First, the supplier oﬀers Retailer 1 the wholesale price w1, and Retailer 1 sets
the retail price p∗∗1 (w1) if he accepts. Next, Retailer 2 observes a noisy signal z = w1 + 
of Retailer 1’s wholesale price oﬀer. The supplier observes signal z as well. Finally,
contingent on the signal z, the supplier oﬀers Retailer 2 the wholesale price w∗∗2 (z), and
Retailer 2 sets the retail price p∗∗2 (w2, z) if he accepts.
In our model, Retailer 2 possesses noisy rational expectations. That is, Retailer 2 has
the correct expectation of the true (but unobserved) wholesale price oﬀer to Retailer 1,
but has some uncertainty over his belief.2 Speciﬁcally, Retailer 2 has the normal prior
belief w ∼ N (μ, σ2) over the ﬁrst wholesale price, where the mean μ = w1 is correct and
the standard deviation σ reﬂects the level of uncertainty in Retailer 2’s prior belief. Let
f denote the probability density function of this prior.
2Our model reﬂects common practice where price decisions are typically kept conﬁdential, and un-
observed prices may be inferred imperfectly from other observables. In the less common scenario where
prices are fully revealed, our model can be applied by taking the limit σ → 0.
7
After observing the signal z, Retailer 2 forms a posterior belief of w1. Consistent with
our experiment reported below, we assume that  is discrete and uniformly distributed
over [−b,+b], b > 0. Therefore, possible values of w1 are given by w˜ ∈ [z− b, z + b], and
Retailer 2’s belief is updated according to Bayes theorem as follows:
p(w˜ = z + κ) =
f(z + κ)∑=b
=−b f(z + )
, κ = −b,−b+ 1, . . . , b− 1, b. (2.5)
Based on the posterior beliefs, Retailer 2 can make inferences about Retailer 1’s proﬁts
to determine whether he is ahead or behind. Let pˆ(z) be the inferred probability that
Retailer 1 has accepted the supplier’s wholesale price oﬀer, and let πˆ1(z) be the inferred
expected proﬁt of Retailer 1 conditional on acceptance. Retailer 2 infers pˆ(z) and πˆ1(z)
as follows: for each possible oﬀer w˜ = z− ,  ∈ [−b, b], Retailer 1 accepts w˜ if u1(w˜) > 0
(here u1 is the utility of Retailer 1’s best response to w˜ assuming acceptance). Let
wˆ = z + κˆ denote the highest wholesale price oﬀer acceptable to Retailer 1. Thus, the
probability that Retailer 1 has accepted the supplier’s oﬀer and become a peer is given
by the summation of all posterior probabilities where w˜ ≤ wˆ:
pˆ(z) =
κˆ∑
κ=−b
p(z + κ) =
∑
κ≤κˆ f(z + κ)∑=b
=−b f(z + )
. (2.6)
Conditional on acceptance, the normalized probability of the acceptable oﬀers (i.e., w˜ ≤
wˆ or κ ≤ κˆ) is
q(w˜ = z + κ) =
p(z + κ)
pˆ(z)
, κ = −b,−b+ 1, . . . , κˆ. (2.7)
Let π1(w˜) be the Retailer 1’s equilibrium proﬁt when the wholesale price oﬀer is w˜, then
the expected proﬁt according to Retailer 2’s belief is given by
πˆ1(z) =
κˆ∑
κ=−b
q(z + k)π1(z + k). (2.8)
This inferred expected proﬁt of Retailer 1 then becomes a reference point for social com-
parison by Retailer 2.
The overall utility function of Retailer 2 is given as follows:
u2 =
{
π2 − δ ·max{πS,2 − π2, 0} − pˆ(z) · ρ · [max{πˆ1(z)− π2, 0}] , if Accept
0 if Reject
(2.9)
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where δ ≥ 0 is the distributional fairness parameter and ρ ≥ 0 is the peer-induced fairness
parameter. In equation (2.9), the second term captures Retailer 2’s aversion to receiving
a smaller proﬁt than the supplier, and the third term captures Retailer 2’s aversion to
receiving a smaller proﬁt than Retailer 1. We stress that peer-induced fairness concerns
are only relevant between peers, i.e., agents in similar situations. Therefore, the third
term in (2.9), which arises when Retailer 2 accepts his oﬀer, makes comparisons against
Retailer 1 only when the latter accepts his oﬀer. (Indeed, an oﬀer refused by Retailer
1 may be deemed too high to be a comparable benchmark.) In this spirit, Retailer 2’s
reference point πˆ1(z) is the conditional expectation of Retailer 1’s proﬁt contingent upon
Retailer 1 accepting his oﬀer, and the comparison between πˆ1(z) and π2 is weighted by
the probability pˆ(z) that Retailer 1 has accepted the oﬀer and is indeed a peer.
The utility function (2.9) shows that Retailer 2 has two separate reference points for
comparison: the supplier’s proﬁt from interacting with himself, i.e., πS,2, and Retailer 1’s
proﬁt conditional on having accepted the oﬀer, i.e., πˆ1(z). Falling behind each reference
point leads to separate disutility terms in (2.9) triggered by diﬀerent types of fairness
concerns.3 In this way, our model clearly distinguishes between distributional fairness
and peer-induced fairness.
Based on the calculations above, Retailer 2 chooses the best response to maximize his
utility as speciﬁed in (2.9). Let p∗∗2 denote the optimal retail price that maximizes the
ﬁrst line in (2.9). Then, Retailer 2’s best response is to set the retail price as p∗∗2 if the
result leads to a positive utility and to reject the supplier’s oﬀer otherwise. Note that
Retailer 2’s best response is inﬂuenced by both peer-induced and distributional fairness
concerns. In contrast, in the previous section, Retailer 1’s best response accounts only for
distributional fairness concerns.4 The next lemma compares the optimal retail prices of
3A more general model of inequity aversion includes both aversion to disadvantageous inequality
(considered in our model) as well as aversion to advantageous inequality (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999,
and Charness and Rabin, 2002). The latter has been found to be empirically absent in a related model
(see Ho and Su, 2009). Therefore, we omit advantageous inequality in our model.
4We do not incorporate peer-induced fairness into Retailer 1’s utility because prior research (Ho and
Su 2009) shows that Retailer 1 does not look ahead and form rational expectation over Retailer 2’s
expected proﬁt. As a consequence, Retailer 1 does not exhibit peer-induced fairness.
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Retailers 1 and 2, conditional on contract acceptance, in response to the same wholesale
price oﬀer from the supplier.
Lemma 1. Suppose the supplier oﬀers the same wholesale price w to both retailers, and
suppose both retailers accept the oﬀer. Then, the optimal retail prices that maximize the
utilities of Retailers 1 and 2 satisfy p∗∗1 (w) ≥ p∗∗2 (w).
Proof: See Appendix.
The above lemma states that when peer-induced fairness is in eﬀect (ρ > 0), Retailer
1’s price is weakly higher than Retailer 2’s price, condition on the same wholesale price
oﬀer from the supplier. This is so because Retailer 2 must balance the opposing forces
of not being behind the supplier and not being behind Retailer 1. The ﬁrst force pushes
Retailer 2’s price higher while second force pulls it lower. As a consequence, Retailer 2
prices less aggressively than Retailer 1.
Given the systematic diﬀerences in the best response functions between Retailers 1 and 2,
the supplier can strategically make diﬀerent wholesale price oﬀers to the retailers in order
to optimize her total proﬁt from the retailers. The supplier’s problem is forumulated as
follows. Recall that the supplier’s proﬁt from Retailer 2 depends on the signal z = w1+,
and can be written as
πS,2(w2, z) =
{
(w2 − c)(a− p2), if Accept
0 if Reject
(2.10)
On the other hand, the supplier’s proﬁt from Retailer 1 remains the same as that in the
model with only distributional fairness concerns and is given by
πS,1(w1) =
{
(w1 − c)(a− p1), if Accept
0 if Reject
(2.11)
Therefore, the supplier’s objective of the entire game is to maximize
πS,1(w1) +Ez [πS,2(w2, z)] . (2.12)
Based on this model, we can fully characterize the supplier’s optimal pricing decisions,
taking into account the diﬀerences between best responses of Retailers 1 and 2. The
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details are deferred to the Appendix.
Our equilibrium characterization allows us to compare economic outcomes for the re-
tailers as a consequence of peer-induced fairness. In particular, will the second retailer
receive a higher or lower wholesale price, and will he earn higher or lower proﬁts? The
following propositions answer these questions.
Proposition 2. Suppose ρ > 0 is not too large. Then, the supplier’s wholesale price oﬀer
to Retailer 2 is higher than the wholesale price oﬀer to Retailer 1; that is, w∗∗2 ≥ w∗∗1 .
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 3. Suppose ρ > 0 is not too large. Then, Retailer 2 earns less proﬁt
(i.e., π2 ≤ π1) and enjoys a smaller market share of the total channel surplus (i.e.,
π2
πS,2+π2
≤ π1
πS,1+π1
) than Retailer 1.
Proof: See Appendix.
The above results highlight systematic diﬀerences between the economic outcomes for
Retailers 1 and 2, even though they are identical a priori. Proposition 2 shows that
Retailer 2 tends to receive less favorable wholesale price oﬀers, and similarly, Proposition
3 predicts that Retailer 2 will earn lower proﬁts and receive a smaller share of the total
channel surplus. In other words, Retailer 2 is in a worse position compared to Retailer
1, as long as the peer-induced fairness parameter ρ is not too large.5 We shall further
investigate the comparisons between Retailers 1 and 2 in the empirical analysis below.
2.5 Testable Hypotheses
Our analysis above yields Propositions 1-3, which motivate the following testable hy-
potheses:
5It is always possible to ﬁnd an arbitrarily large ρ such that Retailer 2 will reject a wholesale price
oﬀer w2 whenever the signal realization z satisﬁes πˆ1(z) > π2. In this case, to induce Retailer 2 to accept
the oﬀer, the supplier must make a better oﬀer to Retailer 2 than Retailer 1.
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1. Hypothesis 1
Distributional Fairness Hypothesis: Suppose the supplier makes wholesale price
oﬀers to the retailers simultaneously. If retailers have only distributional fairness
concerns (i.e., δ > 0 and ρ = 0), the wholesales price oﬀer w∗i is smaller than
wholesale price without fairness concerns, woi .
2. Hypothesis 2
Peer-induced Fairness Hypothesis: Suppose the supplier makes wholesale price of-
fers to the retailers sequentially. If Retailer 2 has both distributional and peer-
induced fairness concerns (i.e., δ > 0 and ρ > 0), then his wholesale price oﬀer,
w∗∗2 , is higher than the wholesale price of Retailer 1, w
∗∗
1 , who has only distributional
fairness.
3. Hypothesis 3
Order-Dependence Hypothesis: Suppose the supplier makes wholesale price oﬀers
to the retailers sequentially. If Retailer 2 has both distributional and peer-induced
fairness concerns (i.e., δ > 0 and ρ > 0), then he receives a lower proﬁt and enjoys
a lower share of total channel surplus than Retailer 1.
3 Experimental Design
Our experimental design consists of 2 treatment conditions: 1) Simultaneous and 2) Se-
quential. In both treatment conditions, we have one supplier selling an identical product
through two retailers, each serving his own independent market. The main diﬀerence
between the treatment conditions is in the manner wholesale price oﬀers are made to
the retailers. In the Simultaneous treatment condition, the supplier makes the wholesale
prices oﬀers to the retailers simultaneously. In the Sequential treatment condition, she
makes these oﬀers sequentially and the second retailer receives a noisy signal of the ﬁrst
wholesale price oﬀer to the ﬁrst retailer before making his decision. Note that only the
second retailer in the Sequential treatment condition is induced to exhibit peer-induced
fairness in this experimental design.6
6We could have chosen to test the Distributional Fairness Hypothesis by having a simpler 1-supplier
and 1-retailer supply chain instead of the simultaneous treatment condition. We choose a 1 supplier
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In both treatment conditions, we set the market size a = 100 and marginal cost c = 20.
As a result, the optimal wholesale price woi = 60 and retail price p
o
i = 80. The stan-
dard model also predicts that the supplier will make a proﬁt of πoS,i = 800 in each retail
market and each retailer will make a proﬁt of π0i = 400 when there is no fairness con-
cern. The noise term  is uniformly distributed over the following set of discrete values
{−25,−20,−15,−10,−5, 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25}.7 We use a standard experimental economics
methodology in running our experiments. Speciﬁcally, subjects’ cash payments are pro-
portional to the proﬁts they make in the experimental task and no deception whatsoever
is used in conducting the experiments.
We recruited 135 subjects from a major university in Asia. Sixty six subjects participated
in 3 sessions of the Simultaneous treatment and 69 subjects in 4 sessions of the Sequen-
tial treatment. The number of subjects in each session is between 15 and 24, and no
subjects participated in more than one session. Upon arriving at the laboratory, subjects
were randomly seated in cubicles with partitions and were not allowed to talk to each
other before and during the experiment. An experimenter read aloud the experimental
instructions and subjects were given a chance to clarify questions in private. In addition,
an understanding check quiz was conducted to ensure that all subjects truly understood
the instructions. Every subject who showed up passed the understanding check and par-
ticipated in the experiments. See Appendix for the experimental instruction used in the
Sequential treatment condition.
Each experiment consisted of 12 identical decision rounds. In each round, subjects were
randomly re-grouped into triplets and randomly assigned roles of either supplier, retailer
1, or retailer 2. Anonymity and random-matching protocol were used in order to mini-
mize any reciprocal or reputation building behaviors. In each round, the supplier makes
and 2-retailer simultaneous treatment because we want to make the two treatment conditions as similar
as possible (e.g. same supply chain structure, the supplier makes the same number of decisions, and
members of supply chain make similar level of proﬁts across the treatment conditions, and etc.)
7Under this uniform noise structure, it is possible that the signal, z, can be negative if actual price
oﬀer w1 < 25. In our experiment, this did not happen. That is, all wholesale price oﬀers to Retailer 1
were above 25.
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wholesale price oﬀers. Retailers either accept or rejected these wholesale price oﬀers and
conditional on acceptance they must determine their retail prices. In the sequential treat-
ment condition, Retailer 2 obtains a noisy signal of Retailer 1’s wholesale price oﬀer. The
experiments were conducted via an online website and subjects’ decisions and feedback
were all done electronically. We also provided subjects with an excel spreadsheet to allow
them to conduct what-if analysis of choosing a price (either wholesale or retail) on their
proﬁts (see Lim and Ho, 2008 for a similar experimental design).
The experimental protocol of the Simultaneous treatment condition is as follows:
1. The supplier chooses wholesale price oﬀers for both retailers simultaneously (w1, w2).
Each retailer receives his respective wholesale price oﬀer without receiving a signal
of what the other retailer’s oﬀer is.
2. Each retailer must independently choose whether or not to accept his respective
wholesale price oﬀer from the supplier. Upon acceptance, retailers must choose
their respective retail price that will in turn determine the units sold according to
the demand function: di = 100− pi. If a retailer rejects an oﬀer, both the supplier
and the retailer receive zero proﬁt for that speciﬁc market.
3. At the end of each round, subjects are informed of their individual decision out-
comes and their respective point earnings.
The experimental protocol of the Sequential treatment condition is as follows:
1. The supplier ﬁrst chooses a wholesale price oﬀer w1 to Retailer 1.
2. After receiving the oﬀer, Retailer 1 must ﬁrst decide whether or not to accept the
oﬀer, and upon acceptance he must choose a retail price p1. These choices are only
revealed to both players at the end of the decision round (i.e., at step 6 of the
experimental protocol).8
8We do not immediately reveal Retailer 1’s decisions to the supplier. This helps to avoid learning
within a round by the supplier, and also to guard against potential wealth eﬀects (e.g., the supplier
becomes more/less generous to Retailer 2 after learning that a good/bad deal has been made with
Retailer 1).
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3. A signal is generated by adding a random number to the ﬁrst wholesale price oﬀer
w1. The value of the random number is drawn from the support {−25,−20,−15,−10,
−5, 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25} with each value equally likely to occur. The signal is made
known to both the supplier and Retailer 2.9
4. The supplier chooses a wholesale price oﬀer w2 to retailer 2.
5. Retailer 2 must now decide whether or not to accept the oﬀer. Upon acceptance,
Retailer 2 must choose a retail price p2.
6. At the end of each round, subjects are informed of their individual decision out-
comes and their respective point earnings.
Each experiment lasted for about one and half hours. Monetary payment was the only
incentive used in the experiment: Subjects were paid a S$5 show-up fee for arriving
on-time, and S$1.6 per 1,000 points in proﬁts they earned in the experiment. Subjects
received on average S$19.2 with minimum payment of S$14.1 and maximum of S$22.8.10
4 Hypothesis Testing and Estimation Results
4.1 Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of subjects’ decisions and proﬁt outcomes.
The left panel of Table 1 shows data from the Simultaneous treatment condition and the
right panel shows data from the Sequential treatment condition. In the Simultaneous
treatment condition, the average wholesale price oﬀers were 57.80 and 57.67 for Retailers
1 and 2 respectively. The retail prices were similar and the percentages of acceptance
were also close. Conditional on acceptance, the average retail prices were 80.09 and 79.70
9Retailer 2 is also asked to report his guess of what the wholesale price to Retailer 1 is and is rewarded
100 points for a correct guess (see Ho and Su, 2009 for a similar design). Retailer 2 is only told whether
her guess is correct or not after the decision round is completed (i.e., at step 6 of the experimental
protocol).
10In this university, the payment rate for research assistance is $8.7 per hour. Hence our payment rate
is about 50% higher than their typical rate of payment.
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Table 1: Subjects’ Decisions and Proﬁt Outcomes
Simultaneous Sequential
Retailer1 Retailer 2 Retailer 1 Retailer 2
Decision variables (N = 264) (N = 264) (N = 276) (N = 276)
Wholesale price (wi) 57.80 (8.03) 57.67 (7.73) 57.47 (8.38) 58.57 (7.88)
w2 −w1 –0.12 (5.06) 1.10 (5.93)
Acceptance (%) 95.08 (21.68) 93.94 (23.91) 96.01 (19.60) 95.65 (20.43)
Retail price (pi) 80.09 (5.19) 79.70 (4.87) 80.17 (7.09) 80.50 (5.97)
Performance variables
(upon acceptance) (N = 251) (N = 248) (N = 264) (N = 263)
Supplier proﬁt 711.03 (134.07) 723.28 (126.54) 698.96 (177.22) 710.03 (169.85)
Retailer proﬁt (πi) 458.63 (159.16) 465.08 (152.05) 448.41 (183.83) 429.40 (171.87)
π2 − π1 5.09 (116.47) –20.92 (149.56)
Retailer share (mi%) 38.53 (8.91) 38.52 (8.16) 38.62 (10.48) 36.94 (9.89)
m2 −m1 –0.02 (6.89) –1.78 (9.55)
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
respectively. The average retailers’ proﬁts were 458.63 and 465.08 and they represented
38.53% and 38.52% of the total channel proﬁt respectively. As the table shows, the dif-
ferences between wholesale price oﬀers, retailer proﬁts, and retailers’ shares of channel
surplus were close to zero.
Similarly, for the Sequential treatment condition, the right panel of Table 1 has 2 columns,
one for each retailer. The average wholesale price oﬀers were 57.47 and 58.57 for Retailers
1 and 2 respectively. While the percentage of acceptance and retail prices were about
the same for both retailers, their proﬁts were quite diﬀerent. Retailer 2 appeared to have
made a lower proﬁt than Retailer 1 (448.41 versus 429.40) and enjoyed a lower share of
the total channel surplus (38.62% versus 36.94%). The diﬀerences between Retailers 1
and 2 in the sequential condition are more pronounced than those in the simultaneous
treatment.
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Table 2: Tests of Hypotheses
Hypothesis Wilcoxon signed-rank test (z-score) p-value
1. Distributional fairness
wi < 60 -8.38 (N = 528) 0.0000
2. Peer-induced fairness
w1 < w2 -3.768 (N = 276 ) 0.0002
3. Order-dependence
(upon both acceptances)
(1) π2 < π1 3.507 (N = 253) 0.0022
(2) π2
π2+πS,2
< π1
π1+πS,1
3.897 (N = 253) 0.0001
4.2 Hypothesis Testing
Table 2 reports Wilcoxon sign-ranked tests with corresponding p-values for our three
hypotheses.
1. H1: Distributional Fairness Hypothesis: To test this hypothesis, we use the data
from the Simultaneous treatment condition. As expected (see Table 1), there is no
diﬀerence between the wholesale price oﬀers between the two retailers (N = 264,
Wilcoxon test, p = 0.44). Hence, we pool the data from both retailers to test the
hypothesis. Wilcoxon signed-rank test suggests that the wholesale price oﬀers are
signiﬁcantly lower than 60 (Wilcoxon test, p < 0.0001). Hence H1 is supported.
To control for potential learning eﬀects or trends in subjects’ decisions, we used a
ﬁrst-order autoregressive model Δwi,t = β0 + β1Δwi,t−1, where Δwi,t = 60 − wi,t
is the diﬀerence between the optimal wholesale price without fairness concern and
the wholesale price oﬀer in round t and Δwi,t−1 is the diﬀerence in round t − 1.
The estimates are βˆ0 = 2.32 and βˆ1 = −0.04, with clustered standard errors of
0.63(p = 0.001) and 0.05(p = 0.432) respectively. The value of β0 suggests that
wholesale price oﬀers remain to be statistically lower than 60. Since β1 is not
statistically diﬀerent from 0, there is minimal learning in the supplier’s wholesale
price decision over time.
2. H2: Peer-Induced Fairness Hypothesis: To test this hypothesis, we examine whether
the diﬀerence in wholesale price oﬀers between Retailers 2 and 1 (i.e., w2−w1) in the
sequential treatment condition is higher than 0. Wilcoxon signed-rank test suggests
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that this is indeed the case (p = 0.0002). Hence, the hypothesis is supported.
Again, to control for potential learning eﬀects or trends, we used a ﬁrst-order
autoregressive model Δwt = β0+β1Δwt−1, where Δwt = w2,t−w1,t is the diﬀerence
in the wholesale price oﬀers in round t and Δwt−1 is the diﬀerence in round t− 1.
The estimates are βˆ0 = 1.18 and βˆ1 = −0.08 and clustered standard errors are
0.36(p = 0.002) and 0.08(p = 0.333) respectively. The value of β0 suggests that
the diﬀerence in wholesale price oﬀers remains statistically higher than 0. Since
β1 is not statistically diﬀerent from 0, there is minimal learning in the supplier’s
wholesale price decision over time.
3. H3: Order-Dependence Hypothesis: To test this hypothesis, we examine whether
the diﬀerences in retailer’s proﬁts and market shares between Retailers 2 and 1 (i.e.,
π2 − π1 and π2π2+πs,2 − π1π1+πs,1 ) in the sequential treatment condition are lower than
0. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests suggest that the diﬀerences in retailers’ proﬁts and
shares of the total channel proﬁt are indeed statistically lower than 0 (p = 0.0022
and p = 0.0001 respectively). Hence H3 is supported. To control for learning eﬀects
or time trends, we used ﬁrst-order autoregressive models as follow:11
(a) Δπt = β0+β1Δπt−1, where Δπt = π2,t−π1,t is the diﬀerence between retailers’
proﬁt in round t and Δπt−1 is the same diﬀerence in round t−1. The estimates
are βˆ0 = −18.99 and βˆ1 = −0.05 with clustered standard errors 9.09(p =
0.038) and 0.06(p = 0.351);
(b) Δmt = β0 + β1Δmt−1, where Δmt =
π2,t
π2,t+πS,2,t
− π1,t
π1,t+πS,1,t
is the diﬀerence
between retailers’ share of total channel proﬁt in round t and Δmt−1 is the
same diﬀerence in round t− 1. The estimates are βˆ0 = −2.03 and βˆ1 = −0.04
with clustered standard errors 0.006(p = 0.001) and 0.04(p = 0.290).
In both cases, β0 remain statistically lower than 0. Since β1 is statistically not
diﬀerent from 0, we conclude that there is no signiﬁcant trend in these performance
measures over time.
In summary, the experimental results suggest that all three hypotheses are supported.
11Since each observation in the two regressions involves decisions by two retailers, we cluster standard
errors by the unit that has the same two subjects playing the role of retailers.
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4.3 Structural Estimation
Our model has two key behavioral parameters, the distributional fairness parameter δ
and the peer-induced fairness parameter ρ. In round t, we observe the following indi-
vidual decisions in triplet j, w1jt, w2jt, I1jt (Retailer 1’s acceptance), I2jt (Retailer 2’s
acceptance), and p1jt and p2jt conditional on acceptance. Note here I1jt and I2jt equal
to 1 for acceptance and 0 for rejection. We assume normal error terms for wholesale and
retail pricing decisions as follows,
w1jt, = w
∗∗
1 + 1,
w2jt, = w
∗∗
2 + 2,
p1jt, = p
∗∗
1 (w1jt) + R1,
p2jt, = p
∗∗
2 (w2jt) + R2.
Here  ∼ N (0, σ2 ) for  = 1, 2, R1, R2. The probability density functions for the pricing
decisions are donated by φ1, φ2, ϕ1, and ϕ2 respectively. Another parameter of the
model, σ is the standard deviation of Retailer 2’s prior belief of w1. Retailers’ acceptance
decisions follow a Logit choice model with their utility as the independent variable:
A1jt =
e(c1+β1·u
∗
1jt)
1 + e(c1+β1·u
∗
1jt)
,
A2jt =
e(c2+β2·u
∗
2jt)
1 + e(c2+β2·u
∗
2jt)
.
where ci, βi, i = 1, 2, are the constants and coeﬃcients of the Logit model, respectively.
u∗1jt (u
∗
2jt) is the optimal utility if the Retailer 1 (Retailer 2) chooses best response assum-
ing acceptance. The joint likelihood function for all decisions can be written as follows:
∏
j
∏
t
{
φ1(w1jt) · [I1jt · A1jt · ϕ1(p1jt) + (1− I1jt) · (1− A1jt)]
·φ2(w2jt) · [I2jt · A2jt · ϕ2(p2jt) + (1− I2jt) · (1− A2jt)]
}
(4.1)
which is maximized over the whole parameter space of δ, ρ, σ, σ1, σ2, σR1, σR2, β1, β2,
c1, and c2.
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We estimate the full model and two nested models: (1) the basic model without any
fairness concerns, that is, δ = ρ = 0; (2) the model with distributional fairness only, that
is, δ > 0 and ρ = 0. Table 3 shows the estimation results. The two nested models are
strongly rejected based on general likelihood principle (χ2 = 146.70, p < 10−31 and χ2 =
69.50, p < 10−15, respectively). Thus, both the distributional and peer-induced fairness
parameters are important in describing the actual behaviors. The estimated peer-induced
fairness parameter (ρ = 6.5380) appears more salient than the distributional fairness
parameter (δ = 0.1043) in determining Retailer 2’s decisions, because the magnitude of
peer comparison between the two retailers is smaller than that of vertical comparison
between the retailer and the supplier.
Table 3: Structural Estimation Results
Parameters Model without fairness Distributional fairness only Full model
δ - 0.0670 0.1043
ρ - - 6.5380
σ - - 9.2088
σ1 8.7340 8.3615 8.3663
σ2 7.9907 7.9165 6.9119
σR1 5.3079 5.0537 5.0256
σR2 4.5219 4.3322 4.3878
β1 0.0075 0.0071 0.0069
β2 0.0055 0.0051 0.0009
c1 0.2089 0.5206 0.6634
c2 0.8767 1.1461 3.2672
LL -3632.82 -3594.22 -3559.47
5 Interpreting the Estimated Structural Model
To gain further insight into the estimated structural model, we present some illustrative
examples. In these numerical examples, we consider the market scenario used in our
laboratory experiments (i.e., market size a = 100 and marginal cost c = 20) and use the
maximum likelihood estimates obtained above (i.e., δ = 0.1043, ρ = 6.5380, σ = 9.2088).
With these parametric values, we can numerically compute the equilibria of the 3 models
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presented in Sections 2.2 to 2.4. Please refer to Table 4 as we discuss these equilibrium
results.
Table 4: Diﬀerences in Wholesale Price Oﬀers, Retail Prices, Retailers’ Proﬁts, and
Supplier’s Proﬁts from Retailers Conditional on Signal Realization
Model I δ = 0, ρ = 0
w∗i = 60, p
∗∗
i = 80, πi = 400, πS,i = 800,
πi
πi+πS,i
= 33.33%
Model II δ = 0.1043, ρ = 0
w∗i = 56.55, p
∗∗
i = 80, πi = 469.04, πS,i = 730.96,
πi
πi+πS,i
= 39.09%
Model III δ = 0.1043, ρ = 6.5380, σ = 9.2088
w∗∗1 = 57.14, p∗∗1 = 80.33, π1 = 456.12, πS1 = 730.77,
π1
π1+πS,1
= 38.43%
 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25
w∗∗2 54.19 56.40 57.85 58.62 58.94 59.07 59.25 59.46 59.46 60.05 62.78
w∗∗2 −w∗∗1 -2.96 -0.74 0.71 1.48 1.80 1.93 2.11 2.32 2.32 2.91 5.64
p∗∗2 77.33 78.45 79.18 79.58 79.74 79.80 79.89 80.00 80.00 80.30 81.68
π2 524.65 475.20 444.04 427.93 421.36 418.68 415.11 410.77 410.77 398.89 346.23
π2
π2+πS,2
% 40.36 37.72 36.04 35.17 34.81 34.66 34.47 34.23 34.23 33.58 30.64
π2 − π1 68.54 19.08 -12.08 -28.19 -34.75 -37.44 -41.01 -45.35 -45.35 -57.23 -109.89
πS,2 775.13 784.48 787.92 788.87 789.09 789.15 789.21 789.23 789.23 789.05 783.64
πS,2 − πS,1 44.36 53.71 57.15 58.11 58.32 58.38 58.44 58.46 58.46 58.28 52.88
Our ﬁrst model (Model I) shows the benchmark case where there are no fairness concerns.
This special case is obtained from our full model by restricting the fairness parameters δ
and ρ to 0. In equilibrium, the retailer earns πi = 400 and the supplier earns πS,i = 800,
so the retailer captures one-third of total supply chain proﬁt. The corresponding retail
price, wholesale price, and marginal cost are 80, 60, and 20 respectively, so the supplier’s
margin is twice that of the Retailer.
In the second model (Model II), we allow for distributional fairness concerns by setting
δ = 0.1043 as estimated above while keeping the peer-induced fairness parameter ρ ﬁxed
at 0. In other words, each retailer is averse to being behind the supplier, but interaction
with each retailer remains independent as before. Consequently, both retailers are oﬀered
the same terms but these terms are better than that in Model I. As Table 4 shows, the
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supplier’s wholesale price oﬀer is w∗i = 56.55, which is lower than the corresponding oﬀer
of 60 in Model I. These observations reaﬃrm the validity of the Distributional Fairness
Hypothesis. However, the retail price p∗i = 80 remains unchanged so the total supply
chain proﬁt remains unchanged. As a result, the retailer earns a larger share of the total
supply chain proﬁt (i.e., 39.09% compared to 33.3% in Model I) and the supplier’s incurs
a proﬁt loss of 8.63% (i.e., from πS,i = 800 to πS,i = 730.96).
We now come to our full model (Model III) which incorporates both distributional
and peer-induced fairness concerns. Recall that the estimated fairness parameters are
δ = 0.1043 and ρ = 6.5380. In addition, our structural estimation yields σ = 9.2088: this
parameter can be interpreted as the inherent uncertainty in the prior of Retailer 2 on the
supplier’s wholesale price oﬀer w1 to Retailer 1. As σ increases, Retailer 2 has a more
diﬀuse prior on w1. With this information structure, the supplier’s wholesale price oﬀer
w2 and Retailer 2’s retail price both depend on the signal realization. Table 4 shows the
equilibrium behavior for all possible signal realizations. Speciﬁcally, as the noise term 
varies from -25 to 25, the supplier’s wholesale price oﬀer w∗∗2 to Retailer 2 ranges from
54.19 to 62.78, with an expected value of 58.73. In contrast, the supplier’s wholesale
price oﬀer to Retailer 1 is w∗∗1 = 57.14 (and it is independent of the signal realization).
Compared to Retailer 1, Retailer 2 receives a less attractive oﬀer under most signal real-
izations.12 Note that this observation lends further support to the Peer-Induced Fairness
Hypothesis. Finally, Retailer 1 makes a proﬁt of π1 = 456.12, which is 38.43% of the total
proﬁt. However, Retailer 2’s proﬁts π2 range from 346.23 to 524.65 (with an expected
value of 426.69) and his proﬁt share ranges from 30.64% to 40.36% (with an expected
value of 35.08%). These comparisons show that Retailer 1 earns about 6.90% more proﬁt
than Retailer 2 and also receives a larger share of total supply chain proﬁt, conﬁrming
the Order-Dependence Hypothesis. As for the supplier, he earns more from Retailer 2
(πS,2 ranges from 775.13 to 783.64 and equals 786.82 in expectation) than from Retailer
12When the signal realizations are very small (i.e.,  = −25 or −20 in our example), Retailer 2
believes that Retailer 1 received an extremely attractive oﬀer, so the inferred expected proﬁt πˆ1(z)
sets an extremely high reference point. In these cases, the estimated peer-induced fairness parameter
ρˆ = 6.5380 is large enough for the peer-induced fairness disutility term pˆ(z) · ρ · [max{πˆ1(z) − π2, 0}] in
(2.9) to dominate. Hence, contrary to Proposition 2, the supplier must lower the wholesale price oﬀer
to induce Retailer 2 to accept, so Retailer 2 receives a better oﬀer than Retailer 1.
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1 (πS,1 = 730.77). The latter ﬁgure is almost identical to that in Model II. Therefore,
as a result of peer-induced fairness concerns, the supplier’s earnings from Retailer 2 has
increased by about 7.67%.
Besides being consistent with the qualitative predictions of the three hypotheses, the
above results provide a quantitative indication of the eﬀects of fairness on economic out-
comes. The Distributional Fairness Hypothesis states that distributional fairness con-
cerns induce the supplier to make a more attractive wholesale price oﬀer to the retailers.
Our results support this prediction and our estimates suggest that the supplier incurs
a proﬁt loss of about 8.63%. Next, the Peer-Induced Fairness Hypothesis predicts that
a supplier making wholesale oﬀers sequentially and facing a second retailer with peer-
induced fairness concerns tends to give a less attractive wholesale price oﬀer to that
retailer. Our results agree with this prediction and further suggest that peer-induced
fairness enables the supplier to regain about 80.91% of the proﬁt loss described above
(i.e., 800 (no fairness) → 730.96 (distributional fairness) → 786.82 (distributional and
peer-induced fairness)). Finally, the Order-Dependence Hypothesis states that the sec-
ond retailer with peer-induced fairness concerns earns less than the ﬁrst retailer without
these concerns. Again, our results support this claim and our structural estimates sug-
gest that the earnings diﬀerential between the two retailers is 6.45% on average and can
be more than 20% for very high values of signal realization (e.g.,  = 25).
Remarkably, non-pecuniary fairness concerns can generate signiﬁcant economic impli-
cations. The underlying intuition can be explained as follows. First, consider a single
dyadic supply chain in which distributional fairness concerns arise. In the event that the
supplier makes an unfair oﬀer (e.g., one in which the supplier retains a lion’s share of to-
tal proﬁts), the retailer is tempted to punish the supplier. The most drastic punishment
would be to reject the oﬀer, which leads to zero proﬁt for both parties, but this is un-
likely to occur in equilibrium. A more plausible equilibrium response is for the retailer to
overprice, i.e., choose a price higher than the proﬁt-maximizing response to the supplier’s
wholesale price. A higher price reduces demand. Therefore, the retailer’s action reduces
his own slice of the pie but shrinks the supplier’s slice by even more (since the supplier’s
margin is higher, given his unfavorable oﬀer). The result is a more equitable distribution
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of proﬁts as preferred by the retailer. In other words, when faced with an unfair oﬀer, the
retailer is willing to hurt himself in order to hurt the supplier even more. Such strategic
threats keep the supplier in check. Consequently, in equilibrium, the supplier surrenders
a larger portion of the total channel proﬁt to the retailer.
Now, we add a second dyadic supply chain to the picture. The second retailer interacts
with the same supplier and thus looks to the ﬁrst retailer as a peer. With peer-induced
fairness concerns, the second retailer is averse to falling behind the ﬁrst retailer. The
urge to keep up with the ﬁrst retailer makes the second retailer less willing to sacriﬁce
some proﬁt to punish the supplier for an unfavorable oﬀer (as described above). As a
result, the supplier can indeed charge the second retailer a higher wholesale price and
leave him a smaller fraction of the total supply chain proﬁt. We see that the two types of
fairness concerns interact as follows: peer-induced fairness concerns partially neutralize
the eﬀect of distributional fairness concerns in attaining equitable proﬁt sharing between
the supplier and retailer. Therefore, the two types of fairness concerns have opposite
eﬀects: distributional fairness beneﬁts the retailer at the expense of the supplier, but
peer-induced fairness beneﬁts the supplier at the expense of the second retailer.
6 Managerial Implications
Our research suggests that the supplier beneﬁts when peer-induced fairness concerns are
salient to the second retailer. Next, we investigate how the supplier’s proﬁts from Retailer
2 vary with the magnitude of the peer-induced fairness parameter ρ. Figure 1 plots the
supplier’s proﬁts as ρ increases, while keeping all other parameters ﬁxed at the estimated
values. The dashed curve shows the benchmark case where the retailer is concerned only
with distributional fairness but not peer-induced fairness (i.e., Model II) and the solid
curve displays the results with both distributional and peer-induced fairness (i.e., Model
III), averaged over all signal realizations. Comparing these two curves conﬁrms that peer-
induced fairness indeed makes the supplier better oﬀ and increasingly so as ρ increases.
Intuitively, as ρ increases, Retailer 2 becomes more concerned with keeping up with his
peer retailer and is thus less willing to punish the supplier for an unattractive oﬀer. The
supplier takes advantage of this aversion-to-behind behavior and ends up making more
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from Retailer 2.
However, this relationship does not always hold in general. We ﬁnd that the supplier’s
proﬁts may decrease with ρ at very high levels of uncertainty in Retailer 2’s prior, σ.
For example, the dotted curve in Figure 1 shows the what-if results of Model III if the
uncertainty in the prior were to be σ = 30 (note that the estimated value of σ is 9.2088).
In this hypothetical scenario, the supplier’s proﬁts steadily decrease as ρ increases after
ρ = 1. As discussed in Section 2.4, the reason is that the supplier must make low whole-
sale price oﬀers to ensure Retailer 2’s acceptance when he has a very strong peer-induced
fairness concern. In summary, we conclude that as long as the uncertainty in the prior is
not too high, the supplier beneﬁts economically as the peer-induced fairness parameter
increases. 13
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
720
730
740
750
760
770
780
790
800
Peer−induced fairness parameter ρ
Figure 1: Supplier’s proﬁts as ρ varies in Model II (dashed curve), Model III (solid curve)
and Model III with σ = 30 (dotted curve).
The above ﬁndings suggest that uncertainty in Retailer 2’s prior hurts the supplier. This
conjecture seems intuitively plausible. Since peer-induced fairness is eﬀective insofar as
Retailer 1 serves as a reference point for Retailer 2, the supplier prefers this reference
point to be as clear or compelling as possible. Figure 2 plots the supplier’s proﬁts as the
uncertainty in prior parameter σ increases: similar to Figure 1, the dashed curve corre-
13Note that the suppler’s proﬁt curves might not be perfectly smooth. This is so because the retailer
utility functions have kinks (due to existence of the two types of fairness concerns) and these kinks can
cause supplier’s proﬁt function to exhibit discontinuities in its ﬁrst-order derivative.
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sponds to Model II (with only distributional fairness) and the solid curve corresponds to
Model III (with both types of fairness). Our results shows that the supplier’s gains in
proﬁts due to peer-induced fairness decreases with σ. These results conﬁrm that peer-
induced fairness becomes less eﬀective at high levels of uncertainty in Retailer 2’s prior
belief. Put diﬀerently, the supplier is increasingly better oﬀ as Retailer 2 becomes more
conﬁdent in his estimate of Retailer 1’s wholesale price oﬀer.
Why does uncertainty in Retailer 2’s prior hurt the supplier? When uncertainty in the
prior is high, extreme signal realizations are weighted more heavily by Retailer 2. For
example, suppose the equilibrium oﬀer to the ﬁrst retailer is w∗∗1 = 60 but Retailer
2 observes a highly perturbed signal value of z = 85. When σ is small, Retailer 2’s
posterior remains close to his prior (i.e., around 60), but when σ is large, Retailer 2’s
posterior shifts more closely toward the signal value of 85. Such extreme signal realiza-
tions are detrimental to the supplier. On one hand, extremely high signals (indicating
that Retailer 1 received a very high wholesale price) suggest to Retailer 2 that Retailer
1 most likely made a very low proﬁt or even rejected that oﬀer and thus ceases to be a
comparable peer, so peer-induced fairness concerns do not operate. On the other hand,
extremely low signals (indicating that Retailer 1 received a very low wholesale price and
thus enjoyed a high proﬁt) trigger peer-induced fairness concerns that are so strong as
to prompt Retailer 2 to take the drastic course of rejecting the oﬀer in entirety, unless
the supplier compensates Retailer 2 with an unusually favorable oﬀer. In both cases, the
supplier’s proﬁts go down. Thus, high levels of uncertainty in Retailer 2’s prior hurt the
supplier.
Next, we investigate the impact of the distributional fairness parameter δ. Is peer-induced
fairness more eﬀective at high or low values of δ? To answer this question, we compute
the supplier’s equilibrium proﬁts as δ varies and show our results in Figure 3. As in the
previous ﬁgures, the dashed curve corresponds to Model II (with only distributional fair-
ness) and the solid curve corresponds to Model III (with both types of fairness). Again,
we see that the solid curve lies above the dashed curve, indicating that peer-induced
fairness increases supplier proﬁts. However, these proﬁt gains diminish to zero as δ goes
to zero and as δ grows large (i.e., beyond δ = 1.0 in this example). The reasons are as
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Figure 2: Supplier’s proﬁts as σ varies in Model II (dashed curve) and Model III (solid
curve).
follows. When δ is close to zero, the equilibrium outcomes in both Models II and III are
almost identical to those in Model I (i.e., the supplier’s proﬁts are close to 800) because
players focus on proﬁt maximization. Since ﬁnancial incentives overshadow fairness con-
cerns, peer comparisons do not signiﬁcantly impact outcomes. On the other hand, when
δ is large, distributional fairness concerns are so dominant that any deviation from the
50-50 benchmark cannot be tolerated by either retailer. In Model II, the equilibrium
outcome when δ is large involves a wholesale price of 46.67, a retail price of 73.33, and
an equal proﬁt of 711.11 for both the retailer and the supplier. (Note that this is the
equilibrium outcome in Proposition 1 for δ ≥ 1/7.) In Model III, when δ is large, the
supplier may have to contend with even lower proﬁts to compensate for potential peer-
induced fairness concerns, especially under extreme signal realizations. Therefore, we
conclude that peer-induced fairness concerns can eﬀectively improve supplier proﬁts only
when the distributional fairness parameter is neither too large nor too small.
Finally, we compare our results to a related study by Ho and Su (2009). Ho and Su
study peer-induced fairness in a similar setup with two retailers interacting with the
same supplier, but each retailer-supplier interaction is modeled as an ultimatum game
rather than the pricing game considered here. In an ultimatum game, the total pie size
is ﬁxed (i.e., retail price and hence total demand are ﬁxed), so the supplier’s wholesale
price oﬀer translates into a particular division of the pie, which the retailer can only
accept or reject. In this paper, we generalize the ultimatum setup to a pricing game. By
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Figure 3: Supplier’s proﬁts as δ varies in Model II (dashed curve) and Model III (solid
curve).
doing so, we signiﬁcantly enrich our model because endowing the retailer with pricing
power implies that the total pie size will be endogenously determined in equilibrium. As
discussed above, endogenous pie sizes signiﬁcantly change players’ strategies in this game.
The most dramatic diﬀerence between these two studies is the reversal of proﬁt compar-
isons between the retailers. In Ho and Su (2009), Retailer 2 on average makes more proﬁt
than Retailer 1. However, in this paper, the opposite holds. The reason is as follows.
With peer-induced fairness concerns, Retailer 2 naturally uses Retailer 1 as a reference
point, but this reference point plays a diﬀerent role in the two studies. In Ho and Su
(2009), the ultimatum game ends once the retailer accepts or rejects the supplier’s oﬀer;
therefore, the reference point prompts Retailer 2 to accept only if the oﬀer is not too
inferior relative to that of Retailer 1. Put diﬀerently, a higher oﬀer to Retailer 1 makes
the supplier liable to make a comparatively attractive oﬀer to Retailer 2. Consequently,
to avoid creating too high a reference point, the supplier makes a worse oﬀer to Retailer
1 than Retailer 2. In this paper, the game does not end after the retailer accepts the
wholesale price contract. Conditional on contract acceptance, the retailer goes on to
set the retail price, and it is at this stage of the game where the reference point aﬀects
Retailer 2’s behavior. Since Retailer 2 has already accepted the contract, the reference
point now works against his favor by prompting him to attain similar proﬁts as Retailer
1. This aversion to being behind Retailer 1 restricts Retailer 2’s ability to punish the
supplier for making bad wholesale price oﬀers. Recognizing this factor, the supplier in-
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deed leaves Retailer 2 with smaller proﬁts than Retailer 1.
The above discussion suggests that one way Retailer 2 can turn his positional disad-
vantage into an advantage is to make a priori retail price commitments. By doing so,
Retailer 2 eﬀectively changes the current game setup into the one studied by Ho and Su
(2009), where the second retailer is always treated better. In this way, the retailer may
secure a better proﬁt by voluntarily giving up his pricing power.
7 Conclusions
We examine the interaction of distributional and peer-induced fairness in price contract
design in a 1-supplier, 2-retailer supply chain. We show that if the supplier makes whole-
sale price oﬀers simultaneously, it is optimal for the supplier to make a lower wholesale
price oﬀer when the retailers have distributional fairness concerns than when they have
no fairness concerns. Surprisingly, if the supplier makes the wholesale price oﬀers sequen-
tially (and the second retailer has both distributional and peer-induced fairness concerns),
it is optimal for the supplier to make the second wholesale price oﬀer higher than the
ﬁrst wholesale price oﬀer. As a consequence, the second retailer makes a lower proﬁt and
enjoys a lower share of the total channel surplus when compared to the ﬁrst retailer. To
the best of our knowledge, the set of theoretical results relating to sequential price oﬀers
are new to the literature.
We conduct standard economic experiments with subjects motivated by substantial mon-
etary incentives to test our model predictions. The experimental data strongly support
our model predictions. Speciﬁcally, when the supplier makes wholesale price oﬀers si-
multaneously, the wholesale prices are lower than that predicted by the standard model
(where retailers are purely self-interested), conﬁrming that our subjects indeed have dis-
tributional fairness concerns. If wholesale price oﬀers are made sequentially, we ﬁnd that
the second wholesale price oﬀer is indeed higher than the ﬁrst wholesale price oﬀer, sug-
gesting that the second retailer has peer-induced fairness concerns.
Finally, we structurally estimate our general model using the experimental data. We
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show that the two nested models (i.e., a model without fairness concerns and a model
with only distributional fairness concerns) are strongly rejected in favor of the general
model. The estimated parameters suggest that peer-induced fairness is more salient than
distributional fairness in determining second retailer’s pricing behavior.
This research can be extended in several directions. First, the model can be extended
with the supplier using a more complex wholesale pricing contract (e.g., quantity discount
pricing contract). Second, it may be worthwhile to make the demand function a function
of both the sale eﬀort and retail price. For example, the total market size a can be
made dependent on a retailer’s sale eﬀort and one can then investigate how the optimal
sale eﬀort changes as a function of peer-induced fairness concerns. Finally, it may be
interesting to extend the game to a setting where the supplier must interact with the
retailers repeatedly over time (and each retailer receives information on the other’s retail
price). The model must then be extended to have both retailers exhibiting peer-induced
fairness concerns.
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A Instructions
This is an experiment about economic decision-making. The instructions are simple; and if you follow
them carefully and make appropriate decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money which
will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. It is important that you do not look at the
decisions of others, and that you do not talk, laugh, or make noises during the experiment. You will be
warned if you violate this rule the ﬁrst time. If you violate this rule twice, you will be asked to leave
the room immediately and your cash earnings will be $0.
The experiment will consist of 12 decision rounds. In each round, participants will be randomly as-
signed into groups of triplets. One player of each triplet will be assigned the role of SUPPLIER, and
the remaining two players in the triplet will be assigned the role of RETAILERS (RETAILER 1 and
RETAILER 2, respectively). You have an equal chance of playing the role of SUPPLIER, RETAILER
1 or RETAILER 2 in each round. Your role will vary from round to round.
The SUPPLIER sells an identical product through RETAILER 1 and RETAILER 2 to two separate
groups of customers. The SUPPLIER must sequentially decide on a wholesale price oﬀer for each
retailer. RETAILERS must decide whether or not to accept their respective price oﬀer, and upon accep-
tance, choose a retail price at which he/she will sell the product to his/her own customers. The detailed
experimental procedure is described below.
Experimental Procedure
Each decision round consists of ﬁve decision stages:
Stage 1: The SUPPLIER chooses a wholesale price oﬀer for RETAILER 1
The SUPPLIER chooses a WHOLESALE PRICE 1 at which to sell to RETAILER 1. The WHOLE-
SALE PRICE 1 must be a positive integer. Since each unit of product costs the SUPPLIER 20 points,
the SUPPLIER will earn (WHOLESALE PRICE 1 – 20)x( QUANTITY 1), where the number of unit
sold by the SUPPLIER (QUANTITY 1) depends on RETAILER 1’s decisions, which is described next.
Stage 2: RETAILER 1 chooses whether or not to accept the SUPPLIER’s price oﬀer, and upon accept-
ance, must choose a retail price
Upon receiving the wholesale price oﬀer from the SUPPLIER, RETAILER 1 must ﬁrst decide whether
or not to accept the wholesale price oﬀer. If RETAILER 1 rejects the oﬀer, both the SUPPLIER and
RETAILER 1 earn zero point. Speciﬁcally, RETAILER 1 earns zero point for this decision round and
the SUPPLIER earns zero point from RETAILER 1 in this decision round (The SUPPLIER may still
earn point from RETAILER 2 in this decision round if the latter accepts the formers price oﬀer).
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If RETAILER 1 accepts the price oﬀer, he/she must then choose retail PRICE 1 at which to sell to his/her
customers. The retail PRICE 1 must be a positive integer. The number of units sold (QUANTITY 1)
is determined by PRICE 1 in the following way:
QUANTITY 1 = 100 – PRICE 1.
For example, if PRICE 1 is 70, QUANTITY 1 is 30. If PRICE 1 is 30, QUANTITY 1 is 70. Note that
these numbers are chosen arbitrarily for illustrative purposes only.
The decision outcomes of Stage 2 (e.g., whether RETAILER 1 accepts or rejects, and retail PRICE 1)
will only be revealed to the SUPPLIER at the end of the decision round (after Stage 5 is completed).
Stage 3: RETAILER 2 receives a signal about the WHOLESALE PRICE 1
In this stage, RETAILER 2 will receive a signal of the SUPPLIER’s WHOLESALE PRICE 1 oﬀer for
RETAILER 1 in stage 1. The signal is generated as follows:
a. A number X is ﬁrst randomly drawn from a set of 11 numbers: -25, -20, -15, -10, -5, 0, 5, 10, 15,
20, 25; each of which has an equal chance (1/11 chance) of being chosen.
b. The SIGNAL is the sum of X and actual WHOLESALE PRICE 1, that is,
SIGNAL = WHOLESALE PRICE 1 + X.
c. The value of the SIGNAL is announced to both the SUPPLIER and RETAILER 2.
d. Note that we conduct a fresh draw of X for each triplet in each round.
The following tables provide two concrete examples. The left table shows the case where the SIGNAL
value is 50. In this case, there are 11 possible WHOLESALE PRICE 1 oﬀers: it can range from 25 to 75
depending on the value of the random number X. For example, if X is 0, then the WHOLESALE PRICE
1 is 50 (since 50 = 50 + 0). Similarly, if X = 10, then the WHOLESALE PRICE 1 is 40 (since 50 = 40 +
10). The right table shows the case where the SIGNAL is 70. Again, there are 11 possible WHOLESALE
PRICE 1 oﬀers: in this case, it can range from 45 to 95 depending on the value of the random number
of X. Note that the values of the signal in these two examples are chosen only for illustrative purposes.
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WHOLESALE PRICE 1 X SIGNAL
75 – 25 50
70 – 20 50
65 – 15 50
60 – 10 50
55 – 5 50
50 0 50
45 5 50
40 10 50
35 15 50
30 20 50
25 25 50
WHOLESALE PRICE 1 X SIGNAL
95 – 25 70
90 – 20 70
85 – 15 70
80 – 10 70
75 – 5 70
70 0 70
65 5 70
60 10 70
55 15 70
50 20 70
45 25 70
After receiving the SIGNAL, RETAILER 2 will be asked to guess what WHOLESALE PRICE 1 is. If
RETAILER 2’s guess is correct, he or she will receive a total of 100 points as a reward. If RETAILER
2’s guess is wrong, he or she will receive nothing.
Note that whether the RETAILER 2’s guess is correct will be revealed to Retailer 2 at the end of the
decision round (after Stage 5 is completed).
Stage 4: The SUPPLIER chooses a wholesale price oﬀer for RETAILER 2.
The SUPPLIER will be informed of the value of the same SIGNAL RETAILER 2 receives and the
guess RETAILER 2 makes. The SUPPLIER then chooses a WHOLESALE PRICE 2 at which to sell
to RETAILER 2. The WHOLESALE PRICE 2 must be a positive integer. Since each unit costs the
SUPPLIER 20 points, the SUPPLIER will earn (WHOLESALE PRICE 2 – 20)x(QUANTITY 2), where
the number of unit sold by the SUPPLIER (QUANTITY 2) depends on RETAILER 2’s decision, which
is described next.
Stage 5: RETAILER 2 chooses whether or not to accept the SUPPLIER’s price oﬀer, and upon accept-
ance, must choose a retail price
Upon receiving the wholesale price oﬀer from the SUPPLIER, RETAILER 2 must ﬁrst decide whether
or not to accept the price oﬀer. If RETAILER 2 rejects the oﬀer, both the SUPPLIER and RETAILER
2 earn zero point. Speciﬁcally, RETAILER 2 earns zero point for this decision round and the SUPPLIER
earns zero point from RETAILER 2 in this decision round (The SUPPLIER may still earn points from
RETAILER 1 in this decision round if the latter accepts the former’s price oﬀer).
If RETAILER 2 accepts the price oﬀer, he/she must then choose retail PRICE 2 at which to sell to his/her
customers. The retail PRICE 2 must be a positive integer. The number of units sold (QUANTITY 2)
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is determined by PRICE 2 in the following way:
QUANTITY 2 = 100 – PRICE 2.
For example, if PRICE 2 is 70, QUANTITY 2 is 30. If PRICE 2 is 30, QUANTITY 2 is 70. Note that
these numbers are chosen arbitrarily for illustrative purposes only.
Point Earnings
The point earning for each player will be calculated as follows:
1. If RETAILER 1 accepts the SUPPLIER’s oﬀer, his/her point earning equals to
(PRICE 1 – WHOLESALE PRICE 1) x (QUANTITY 1).
That is, the diﬀerence between the price RETAILER 1 charges customers and the price at which
he/she buys the product from the SUPPLIER multiplied by the quantity sold. Note here QUAN-
TITY 1 = 100 – PRICE 1.
If RETAILER 1 chooses not to accept the oﬀer, then QUANTITY 1 is 0, and his/her earning is
0.
2. If RETAILER 2 accepts the SUPPLIER’s oﬀer, his/her point earning equals to
(PRICE 2 – WHOLESALE PRICE 2) x (QUANTITY 2).
That is, the diﬀerence between the price RETAILER 2 charges customers and the price at which
he/she buys the product from the SUPPLIER multiplied by the quantity sold. Note here QUAN-
TITY 2 = 100 – PRICE 2.
If RETAILER 2 chooses not to accept the oﬀer, then QUANTITY 2 is 0, and his/her earning is
0.
3. The SUPPLIER earns points from both RETAILER 1 and 2.
The SUPPLIER’s point earning from RETAILER 1 equals to
(WHOLESALE PRICE 1 – 20)x(QUANTITY 1).
That is, the diﬀerence between the price at which the product is sold to RETAILER 1 and the
unit cost of the product multiplied by the quantity sold. If RETAILER 1 does not accept the
oﬀer, then QUANTITY 1 is 0 and the earning from RETAILER 1 is 0.
The SUPPLIER’s point earning from RETAILER 2 equals to
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(WHOLESALE PRICE 2 – 20) x (QUANTITY 2).
That is, the diﬀerence between the price at which the product is sold to RETAILER 2 and the
unit cost of the product multiplied by the quantity sold. If RETAILER 2 does not accept the
oﬀer, then QUANTITY 2 is 0 and the earning from RETAILER 2 is 0.
The SUPPLIER’s total point earning is the sum of the point earnings from RETAILER 1 and 2,
that is,
(WHOLESALE PRICE 1 – 20)x(QUANTITY 1) + (WHOLESALE PRICE 2 –
20)x(QUANTITY 2).
At the end of each round, the SUPPLIER and both RETAILERS will be informed of their individ-
ual decision outcomes and their earnings. The above decision task is repeated for 12 rounds. In each
round, each player will be randomly grouped into a triplet and have an equal chance of playing SUP-
PLIER, RETAILER 1 or RETAILER 2. Also, a fresh draw of random number X is drawn for each triplet.
Your Dollar Payoﬀs
At the end of the experiment, we will sum your point earning in each round to obtain your total point
earning. We will then multiply your total point earning by $0.0016 to obtain your dollar earning. In
addition, we will add to this dollar earning $5 show-up fee to determine your ﬁnal dollar earning. The
amount will be paid to you in cash before you leave the experiment today.
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B Appendix
2.1 Retailer 1’s Best Response Function
When Retailer 1 experiences distributional fairness, that is, πS,1− π1 ≥ 0, or equivalently p1 ≤ 2w1− c,
Retailer 1’s utility-maximization problem upon acceptance is given by
max
p1
π1 − δ · (πS,1 − π1)
s.t. p1 ≤ 2w1 − c.
The optimal retail price is given by
p1 =
{
a+w1
2 +
δ(w1−c)
2(1+δ) , if w1 ≥ a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ
2w1 − c, otherwise.
When Retailer 1 does not experience distributional fairness, that is, πS,1 − π1 > 0, or p1 > 2w1 − c,
Retailer 2’s utility-maximization problem upon acceptance is given by
max
p1
π1
s.t. p1 > 2w1 − c.
The optimal retail price is given by
p1 =
{
a+w1
2 , if wA <
a+2c
3
2w1 − c, otherwise
Since a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)
3+2δ
> a+2c
3
always holds for δ > 0, Retailer 1’s optimal retail price can be found by
combining the above two cases as follows
p∗∗1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
a+w1
2 +
δ(w1−c)
2(1+δ) , if w1 ≥ a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ
2w1 − c, a+2c3 ≤ w1 < a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ
a+w1
2
, if w1 < a+2c3
(B.1)
As a result, Retailer 1’s best response is to choose p∗∗1 if this leads to a positive utility and to reject
otherwise.
Lemma 2. Retailer 1’s proﬁt π1 and utility u1 under the optimal response given in (B.1) decreases in w1.
Proof. The properties can be veriﬁed by substituting (B.1) into π1 and u1 and take the ﬁrst-order
derivatives with respect to w1.
2.2 Retailer 2’s Best Response and Supplier’s Pricing Decision
2.2.1 Retailer 2’s Decision When w2 > a− 2
√
πˆ1(z)
The diﬀerence between Retailer 2’s and Retailer 1’s problems is that Retailer 2 may experience peer-
induced fairness depending on w2 and p2. Retailer 2 has peer-induced fairness when (a− p2)(p2−w2) <
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πˆ1(z). This inequality always holds when w2 > a− 2
√
πˆ1(z). We ﬁrst analyze Retailer 2’s best response
under this condition, the problem is similar to Retailer 1’s problem shown as follows.
When Retailer 2 experiences distributional fairness, that is πS,2− π2 ≥ 0, or equivalently, p2 ≤ 2w2− c,
Retailer 2’s problem is given by
max
p2
π2 − δ · (πS,2 − π2)− pˆ(z) · ρ · (πˆ1(z)− π2) (B.2)
s.t. p2 ≤ 2w2 − c. (B.3)
The optimal solution for the unconstrained problem (B.2) is p2 = a+w22 +
δ(w2−c)
2(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) . Constraint (B.3)
is satisﬁed when w2 ≥ wI2 := a(1+δ+pˆ·ρ)+c(2(1+pˆ·ρ)+δ)3(1+pˆ·ρ)+2δ . Then Retailer 2’s optimal retail price is given by
p2 =
{
a+w2
2 +
δ(w2−c)
2(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) , if w2 ≥ wI2
2w2 − c, otherwise
(B.4)
When Retailer 2 does not experience distributional fairness, that is πS,2 − π2 < 0, or equivalently,
p2 > 2w2 − c, Retailer 2’s problem is given by
max
p2
π2 − pˆ(z) · ρ · (πˆ1(z) − π2) (B.5)
s.t. p2 > 2w2 − c. (B.6)
The optimal solution for the unconstrained problem (B.5) is p2 = a+w22 . Constraint (B.6) is satisﬁed
when w2 < a+2c3 . Then Retailer 2’s optimal retail price is given by
p2 =
{
2w2 − c, if w2 ≥ a+2c3
a+w2
2 , otherwise
(B.7)
Since a(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ)+c(2(1+pˆ(z)·ρ)+δ)3(1+pˆ(z)·ρ)+2δ >
a+2c
3 always holds for δ > 0, Retailer 2’s optimal retail price when
w2 > a− 2
√
πˆ1(z) can be found by combining (B.4) and (B.7) as follows
p∗∗2 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
a+w2
2 +
δ(w2−c)
2(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) , if w2 ≥ wI2
2w2 − c, a+2c3 ≤ w2 < wI2
a+w2
2 , if w2 <
a+2c
3
(B.8)
As a result, Retailer 2’s best response is to choose p∗∗2 if this leads to a positive utility and to reject
otherwise.
2.2.2 Supplier’s Decision When w2 > a− 2
√
πˆ1(z)
Given the best response function (B.8) and conditional on contract acceptance, the optimal whole-
sale price oﬀer can be found as follows: (1) When w2 ≥ wI2 , the supplier’s proﬁt function is πS,2 =(
a− a+w22 − δ(w2−c)2(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ)
)
· (w2 − c), and the optimal solution is w2 = a+c2 − δ(a−c)2(1+2δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) . This solu-
tion satisﬁes the condition w2 ≥ wI2 when δ ≤ 1+pˆ(z)·ρ2 . When δ > 1+pˆ(z)·ρ2 , the optimal decision in this
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region is w2 = wI2 ; (2) When
a+2c
3
≤ w2 < wI2 , the supplier’s proﬁt is πS,2 = (a− 2w2 + c)(w2 − c). The
optimal solution is w2 = a+3c4 that is not within the boundaries of
a+2c
3 ≤ w2 < wIB, and the optimal
wholesale price is w2 = a+2c3 ; (3) When w2 <
a+2c
3 , the supplier’s proﬁt is πS,2 =
(
a− a+w22
)
(w2 − c).
The optimal solution is w2 = a+c2 that is not within the boundaries of w2 ≤ a+2c3 , and the optimal
wholesale price is w2 = a+2c3 .
For (1), the supplier’s proﬁt is (a−c)
2(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ)
8(1+2δ+pˆ(z)ρ) , and for (2) and (3), the supplier’s proﬁt is
(a−c)2
9 . Com-
paring these two potential proﬁts, (a−c)
2(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ)
8(1+2δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) >
(a−c)2
9 when δ <
1+pˆ(z)ρ
7 . Therefore, conditional
on contract acceptance, the supplier’s optimal decision is
w∗∗2 =
{
a+c
2 − δ(a−c)2(1+2δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) , if δ < 1+pˆ(z)·ρ7
a+2c
3
, otherwise
(B.9)
2.2.3 Retailer 2’s Decision When w2 ≤ a− 2
√
πˆ1(z)
When w2 ≤ a − 2
√
πˆ1(z), we consider four scenarios of Retailer 2’s utility maximization problem
according to possible fairness concerns experienced by Retailer 2.
Case 1. Retailer 2 is neither behind Retailer 1 nor behind the supplier, or equivalently, (1) (a − p2) ·
(p2 − w2) > πˆ1(z), i.e., a+w2−
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2
< p2 <
a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2
; (2) (a − p2) · (p2 − w2) >
(a− p2)(w2 − c), i.e., p2 > 2w2 − c. Then Retailer 2’s problem is given by
max
p2
π2 (B.10)
s.t. p2 > 2w2 − c. (B.11)
a + w2 −
√
(a −w2)2 − 4πˆ1(z)
2
< p2 <
a + w2 +
√
(a− w2)2 − 4πˆ1(z)
2
(B.12)
The optimal solution for the unconstrained problem (B.10) is p2 = a+w22 . Constraint (B.11) is met when
wB <
a+2c
3
; Constraint (B.12) is always met for w2 ≤ a− 2
√
πˆ1(z). Therefore, the optimal retail price
is p2 = a+w22 for w2 <
a+2c
3
.
When w2 ≥ a+2c3 , (B.11) is violated, and the candidate solution is p2 = 2w2 − c. Note that when
w2 = a+2c3 , we have
a+w2−
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2
< a+w2
2
= 2w2 − c < a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2
. Moreover,
a+w2−
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 < 2w2 − c <
a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 holds when
a+3c−
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4 < w2 <
a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4
. Since a+3c−
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4
< a+2c
3
, the best response is p2 = 2w2 − c for a+23 ≤
w2 <
a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4 . When w2 ≥
a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4 , there is no feasible region for (B.10).
Therefore, the optimal retail price is given by
p2 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Infeasible, if w2 ≥ max{a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4
, a+2c
3
}
2w2 − c, if a+2c3 ≤ w2 < max{
a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4 ,
a+2c
3 }
a+w2
2 , if w2 <
a+2c
3
(B.13)
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Case 2. Retailer 2 is behind Retailer 1 but not behind the supplier, or equivalently, (1) (a− p2) · (p2 −
w2) ≤ πˆ1(z), i.e., p2 ≤ a+w2−
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 , or p2 ≥
a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 ; (2) (a − p2) · (p2 −w2) >
(a− p2)(w2 − c), i.e., p2 > 2w2 − c. then Retailer 2’s problem is given by
max
p2
π2 − pˆ(z) · ρ · (πˆ1(z)− π2) (B.14)
s.t. p2 > 2w2 − c. (B.15)
p2 ≥ a + w2 +
√
(a− w2)2 − 4πˆ1(z)
2
or p2 ≤ a + w2 −
√
(a−w2)2 − 4πˆ1(z)
2
(B.16)
The optimal solution for the unconstrained problem (B.14) is p2 = a+w22 . For this response, con-
straint (B.15) is met when w2 < a+2c3 ; Constraint (B.16) is not met for w2 < a − 2
√
πˆ1(z). However,
when w2 < a+2c3 , it is not optimal for Retailer 2 to meet constraint (B.16) because Retailer 2 can
achieve a higher utility when (B.16) is not met. Note the objective function (B.14) is equivalent to
(1 + pˆ(z) · ρ)π2 − pˆ(z) · ρ · πˆ1(z), and pˆ(z) · ρ · πˆ1(z) is a constant. The optimal solution to π2, when
feasible, is also optimal to the current problem (B.14). Therefore, p2 = a+w22 is the optimal retail price
for w2 < a+2c3 .
When w2 ≥ a+2c3 , (B.15) is violated for the unconstrained optimal solution and the candidate so-
lution is p2 = 2w2 − c. (B.16) holds when w2 ≥ a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4 (i.e., the ﬁrst inequality of
(B.16) holds) or w2 ≤ a+3c−
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4 (i.e., the second inequality of (B.16) holds) . Note here
a+3c−
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4 <
a+2c
3 . When w2 ≤
a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4 , p2 =
a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 and (B.15)
holds.
Therefore, the optimal retail price is given by
p2 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
2w2 − c, if w2 ≥ max{a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4
, a+2c
3
}
a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 , if
a+2c
3 ≤ w2 < max{
a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4 ,
a+2c
3 }
a+w2
2
, if w2 < a+2c3
(B.17)
Combining Cases 1 and 2: In Cases 1 and 2, Retailer 2 does not experience distributional fairness
(i.e., p2 > 2w2 − c). For w2 ≥ max{a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4
, a+2c
3
}, the only feasible best response is from
Case 2. For a+2c3 ≤ w2 < max{
a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4 ,
a+2c
3 }, Cases 1 and 2 have give diﬀerent best re-
sponses. However, the overall best response in this region is p2 = 2w2 − c for the following reasons: In
case 1, Retailer 2’s total utility is u12 = π2(2w2 − c), and in case 2, u22 = π2
(
a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2
)
.
In this region, we also have 2w2 − c ≤ a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2
. Furthermore, the optimal solution for π2
without any constraint is a+w2
2
. When w2 ≥ a+2c3 , we have a+w22 ≤ 2w2 − c. Because π2 is concave in
p2, we have π2(2w2 − c) ≥ π2(a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 ), that is u
1
2 ≥ u22. Therefore, 2w2 − c is the best
response for a+2c
3
≤ w2 < max
{
a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4
, a+2c
3
}
. When w2 < a+2c3 , both cases have the
same best response.
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Combining the two best responses (B.13) and (B.17), we have the following optimal retail price for the
case wherein Retailer 2 does not experience distributional fairness
p2 =
{
2w2 − c, if w2 ≥ a+2c3
a+w2
2
, if w2 < a+2c3
(B.18)
Case 3. Retailer 2 is behind both Retailer 1 and the supplier, or equivalently, (1) (a− p2) · (p2−w2) ≤
πˆ1(z), i.e., p2 ≥ a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 or p2 ≤
a+w2−
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 ; (2) (a − p2) · (p2 − w2) ≤ (a −
p2) · (w2 − c), i.e., p2 ≤ 2w2 − c, then Retailer 2’s problem is given by
max
p2
π2 − δ · (πS,2 − π2)− pˆ(z) · ρ · (πˆ1(z) − π2) (B.19)
s.t. p2 ≤ 2w2 − c, (B.20)
p2 ≥ a + w2 +
√
(a− w2)2 − 4πˆ1(z)
2
or p2 ≤ a + w2 −
√
(a−w2)2 − 4πˆ1(z)
2
(B.21)
The optimal solution for the unconstrained problem (B.19) is p2 = a+w22 +
δ(w2−c)
2(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) . Constraint
(B.20) is met when w2 ≥ wI2 = a(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ)+c(2(1+pˆ(z)·ρ)+δ)3(1+pˆ(z)·ρ)+2δ ; Constraint (B.21) is met when w2 ≥ wII2 :=
a−ψ·c−
√
ψ(a−c)2+(1−ψ)4πˆ1(z)
1−ψ . Here, ψ :=
(
δ
1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ
)2
.
Note in Case 3, we only need to consider w2 ≥ a+2c3 . For w2 < a+2c3 , the objective function in Case 2 is
superior and is achievable by choosing p2 = a+w22 .
When wII2 > w
I
2 and w2 ≥ wII2 , the optimal retail price is p2 = a+w22 + δ(w2−c)2(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) . When w2 < wII2 ,
(B.21) is violated, and the candidate solution is p2 =
a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 . Note that when w2 = w
II
2 ,
we have p2 = a+w22 +
δ(w2−c)
2(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) =
a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2
≤ 2w2 − c. The inequality holds be-
cause wII2 > w
I
2 . Moreover, this inequality holds for
a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4
≤ w2 < wII2 .14 Therefore,
the optimal retail price is p2 =
a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 for
a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4 ≤ w2 < wII2 . When
a+3c−
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4
< w2 <
a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4
, (B.20) and (B.21) give a+w2−
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2
as
the only feasible solution. Note here a+3c−
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4 <
a+2c
3 . Therefore, for
a+2c
3 ≤ w2 <
a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4
, the best response p2 =
a+w2−
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2
.
Therefore, the optimal retail price for wII2 > wI2 is given by
p2 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
a+w2
2 +
δ(w2−c)
2(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) , if w2 ≥ wII2
a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(w1)
2 , if
a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4 ≤ w2 < wII2
a+w2−
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 , if
a+2c
3 ≤ w2 <
a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4
(B.22)
When wII2 ≤ wI2 and w2 > wI2 , the optimal retail price is p2 = a+w22 + δ(w2−c)2(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) . When w2 < wI2,
(B.20) is not met, and the candidate solution is p2 = 2w2 − c. Note that when w2 = wI2 , we
14Since we only consider w2 ≥ a+2c3 and w2 < a − 2
√
πˆ1(z), these two conditions imply that πˆ1(z) <
(a−c)2
9 and thus (a− c)2 − 8πˆ1(z) > 0.
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have p2 = a+w22 +
δ(w2−c)
2(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) = 2w2 − c ≥
a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 . The inequality holds because
wI2 > w
II
2 . Moreover, this inequality holds for
a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4
≤ w2 < wI2 . Therefore, the best
response is p2 = 2w2 − c for a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4 ≤ w2 < wI2 . When
a+3c−
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4 < w2 <
a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4
, (B.20) and (B.21) give a+w2−
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2
as the only feasible solution. Note
here a+3c−
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4 <
a+2c
3 . Therefore, for
a+2c
3 ≤ w2 <
a+3c−
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4 , the optimal retail
price p2 =
a+w2−
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2
.
The optimal retail price for wII2 ≤ wI2 is given by
p2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
a+w2
2 +
δ(w2−c)
2(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ)) , if w2 ≥ wI2
2w2 − c, if a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4
≤ w2 < wI2
a+w2−
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 , if
a+2c
3 ≤ w2 <
a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4
(B.23)
Case 4. When Retailer 2 is behind the supplier but not behind Retailer 1, that is, (1) (a−p2)·(p2−w2) >
πˆ1(z), i.e.,
a+w2−
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 < p2 <
a+w2−
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 ; (2) (a−p2)·(p2−w2) ≤ (a−p2)·(w2−c),
i.e., p2 ≤ 2w2 − c , then Retailer 2’s problem is given by
max
p2
π2 − δ · (πS,2 − π2) (B.24)
s.t. p2 ≤ 2w2 − c. (B.25)
a + w2 −
√
(a −w2)2 − 4πˆ1(z)
2
< p2 <
a + w2 +
√
(a− w2)2 − 4πˆ1(z)
2
(B.26)
The optimal solution for the unconstrained problem (B.24) is p2 = a+w22 +
δ(w2−c)
2(1+δ)
. Constraint (B.25) is
met when w2 ≥ a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ ; Constraint (B.26) is met when w2 < wIII2 :=
a−φc−
√
φ(a−c)2+(1−φ)4πˆ1(z)
1−φ .
Here, φ :=
(
δ
1+δ
)2
. Note here wIII2 ≤ wII2 .
Note similar to Case 3, we only need to consider w2 ≥ a+2c3 . For w2 < a+2c3 , the objective function in
Case 1 is superior and is achievable by choosing p2 = a+w22 .
When wIII2 >
a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)
3+2δ and
a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)
3+2δ ≤ wB < wIII3 , the optimal retail price is p2 = a+w22 +
δ(w2−c)
2(1+δ) . When w2 ≥ wIII2 , (B.26) is violated, and the candidate solution is p2 =
a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 .
Note that when w2 = wIII2 , we have p2 =
a+w2
2 +
δ(w2−c)
2(1+δ) =
a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 ≤ 2w2 − c. The
inequality a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 ≤ 2w2 − c always holds for w2 ≥ wIII2 because F (w2) := 2w2 −
c −
(
a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2
)
is increasing in w2. Note here wIII2 >
a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4
, because
F
(
a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4
)
= 0.
For w2 <
a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)
3+2δ , (B.25) is violated, and the candidate solution is p2 = 2w2 − c. Note when
w2 =
a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)
3+2δ , we have p2 =
a+w2
2 +
δ(w2−c)
2(1+δ) = 2w2 − c <
a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 . Then 2w2 − c <
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a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 holds for all w2 <
a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)
3+2δ because F (w2) is increasing in w2. When
p2 = 2w2 − c, a+w2−
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 < p2 in (B.26) holds when w2 >
a+3c−
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4 . Note
here a+3c−
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4 <
a+2c
3 . Therefore, for
a+2c
3 ≤ w2 < a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ , the optimal retail price is
p2 = 2w2 − c.
Therefore, the optimal response when wIII2 >
a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)
3+2δ
is given by
p2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 , if w2 ≥ wIII2
a+w2
2 +
δ(w2−c)
2(1+δ) , if
a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)
3+2δ ≤ w2 < wIII2
2w2 − c, if a+2c3 ≤ w2 < a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ
(B.27)
When wIII2 ≤ a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ , the unconstrained optimal solution is not feasible. Then the optimal retail
price occurs on one of the binding constraint, and is given by
p2 =
⎧⎨
⎩
a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 , if w2 ≥
a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4
2w2 − c, if a+2c3 ≤ w2 <
a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4
(B.28)
Combining Cases 3 and 4, and with 1 and 2 to obtain the best-response retail price for
the entire problem In cases 3 and 4, Retailer 2 experiences distributional fairness. The two cases are
distinguished by whether Retailer 2 experiences peer-induced fairness. The two cases can be “pasted”
together to obtain the best responses when distributional fairness is salient. Cases 1 and 2 have been
combined and can then be added to obtain the best response of the entire problem. However, both case
3 and 4 have two possible response functions, and in total there are four possible optimal responses as
follows.
Best-Response Retail Price 1.
When wII2 > wI2 and wIII2 >
a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)
3+2δ , we need to combine (B.22), (B.27) and (B.18), and the
optimal response is given as follows
p∗∗2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
a+w2
2 +
δ(w2−c)
2(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) , if w2 ≥ wII2
a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 , if w
III
2 ≤ w2 < wII2
a+w2
2 +
δ(w2−c)
2(1+δ) , if
a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)
3+2δ ≤ w2 < wIII2
2w2 − c, if a+2c3 ≤ w2 < a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ
a+w2
2 , if w2 <
a+2c
3
(B.29)
This response function takes the optimal retail price from Case 4 from w2 < wIII2 and from Case 3 for
w2 ≥ wIII2 . For a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ ≤ w2 < wIII2 , Case 4 has an interior optimal solution p2 = a+w22 + δ(w2−c)2(1+δ) ,
and the objective function is alway superior to the one in Case 3. Therefore, a+w22 +
δ(w2−c)
2(1+δ) is the best
response for Case 3 and 4 combined when a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ ≤ w2 < wIII2 . For a+2c3 ≤ w2 < a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ ,
we compare the values of the objective functions in Cases 3 and 4 as follows: the utility in Case 3 is
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u32 = u
(
a+w2−
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2
)
, and in Case 4, u42 = u (2w2 − c), where u(p2) := π2 − δ · (πS,2 − π2)
is concave in p2. Note that when a+2c3 ≤ w2 < a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ , we have a+w22 + δ(w2−c)2(1+δ) > 2w2 − c >
a+w2−
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 . Since p2 =
a+w2
2 +
δ(w2−c)
2(1+δ) maximizes u(p2) and u is concave, we have u
4
2 ≥ u32,
and p2 = 2w2 − c is optimal for a+2c3 ≤ w2 < a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ . Recall that wIII2 ≤ wII2 , and the best re-
sponses for wIII2 ≤ w2 < wII2 are common in both cases (Also recall that wIII2 > a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4 ).
When w2 ≥ wII2 , a+w22 + δ(w2−c)2(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) is the interior optimal solution to Case 3, and it is optimal for
Case 3 and 4 combined because the best response in Case 4 is on the boundary of the feasible region of
Case 3 and thus is suboptimal to Case 3. The last line in the response function is pasted from (B.18).
Supplier’s Pricing Decision Under Best-Response Retail Price 1
Given the best response function (B.29), the optimal wholesale price oﬀer can be found as follows: (1)
When w2 ≥ wII2 , the supplier’s proﬁt function is πS,2 =
(
a− a+w2
2
− δ(w2−c)
2(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ)
)
· (w2 − c). The
optimal solution is w2 = a+c2 − δ(a−c)2(1+2δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) . The solution satisﬁes the condition w2 ≥ wII2 when
πˆ1(z) ≥ (a−c)
2(1+4δ+pˆ(z)·ρ)
16(1+2δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) . When πˆ1(z) <
(a−c)2(1+4δ+pˆ(z)·ρ)
16(1+2δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) , the optimal decision is w2 = w
II
2 ; (2)
When wIII2 ≤ w2 < wII2 , the supplier’s proﬁt is πS,2 =
(
a− a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2
)
· (w2 − c) that is
an increasing function of w2. Therefore, the optimal solution is w2 = wIIB ; (3) When
a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)
3+2δ ≤
w2 < w
III
2 , the supplier’s proﬁt is πS,2 =
(
a− a+w2
2
− δ(w2−c)
2(1+δ)
)
(w2 − c). The optimal solution is
w2 = a+c2 − δ(a−c)2(1+2δ) that satisﬁes a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ ≤ w2 < wIII2 when δ < 17 and πˆ1(z) < (a−c)
2(1+4δ)
16(1+2δ)
; (4)
When a+2c
3
≤ w2 < a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ , the supplier’s proﬁt is πS,2 = (a − 2w2 + c)(w2 − c). The optimal
solution is w2 = a+3c4 that is not within the boundaries of
a+2c
3 ≤ w2 < a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ , and the optimal
wholesale price is w2 = a+2c3 ; (5) When w2 <
a+2c
3 , the supplier’s proﬁt is πS,2 =
(
a− a+w22
)
(w2 − c).
The optimal solution is w2 = a+c2 that is not within the boundaries of w2 <
a+2c
3 , and the optimal
wholesale price is w2 = a+2c3 .
For (1), the supplier’s proﬁt is (a−c)
2(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ)
8(1+2δ+pˆ(z)ρ) when πˆ1(z) ≥ (a−c)
2(1+4δ+pˆ(z)·ρ)
16(1+2δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) , for (2) the sup-
plier’s proﬁt is πS,2(wII2 ) =
(
a− a+w
II
2 +
√
(a−wII2 )2−4πˆ1(z)
2
)
· (wII2 − c) for (3) the supplier’s proﬁt is
(a−c)2(1+δ)
8(1+2δ)
and for (4) and (5), the supplier’s proﬁt is (a−c)
2
9
.
Note that it always holds that (a−c)
2(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ)
8(1+2δ+pˆ(z)ρ) >
(a−c)2(1+δ)
8(1+2δ) for δ > 0. Furthermore, we have
(a−c)2(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ)
8(1+2δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) >
(a−c)2
9 when δ <
1+pˆ(z)ρ
7 , and
(a−c)2(1+δ)
8(1+2δ) >
(a−c)2
9 when δ <
1
7 .
When πˆ1(z) ≥ (a−c)
2(1+4δ+pˆ(z)·ρ)
16(1+2δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) , the supplier’s optimal pricing decision is
w∗∗2 =
{
a+c
2 − δ(a−c)2(1+2δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) , if δ < 1+pˆ(z)·ρ7
a+2c
3 , otherwise
(B.30)
When πˆ1(z) <
(a−c)2(1+4δ+pˆ(z)·ρ)
16(1+2δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) , the supplier’s optimal decision is either w
II
2 (i.e., the local optimal
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decision for w2 ≥ wIII2 ) or the following one (this is the local optimal decision for w2 < wIII2 ),
w∗∗2 =
{
a+c
2 − δ(a−c)2(1+2δ) , if δ < 17
a+2c
3 , otherwise
(B.31)
By comparing the proﬁts of the two local maximizers, wII2 is optimal globally if πS,2(wII2 ) ≥ πS,2(w∗∗2 );
otherwise, w∗∗2 in (B.31) is optimal.
Following the similar approach, we obtain the best-response retail price and optimal wholesale prices for
the other three cases as follows:
Best-Response Retail Price 2.
The best response for the entire problem for wII2 ≤ wI2 and wIII2 > a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ is given as as follows
p∗∗2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
a+w2
2
+ δ(w2−c)
2(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) , if w2 ≥ wI2
2w2 − c, if wIII2 ≤ w2 < wI2
a+w2
2 +
δ(w2−c)
2(1+δ) , if
a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)
3+2δ ≤ w2 < wIII2
2w2 − c, if a+2c3 ≤ w2 < a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ
a+w2
2 , if w2 <
a+2c
3
(B.32)
The supplier’s optimal decision is
w∗∗2 =
{
a+c
2 − δ(a−c)2(1+2δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) , if δ < 1+pˆ(z)·ρ7
a+2c
3 , otherwise
(B.33)
Best-Response Retail Price 3.
The best-response retail price for the entire problem for wII2 > w
I
2 and w
III
2 ≤ a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ is given as
as follows
p∗∗2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
a+w2
2 +
δ(w2−c)
2(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) , if w2 ≥ wII2
a+w2+
√
(a−w2)2−4πˆ1(z)
2 , if
a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4 ≤ w2 < wII2
2w2 − c, if a+2c3 ≤ w2 <
a+3c+
√
(a−c)2−8πˆ1(z)
4
a+w2
2 , if w2 <
a+2c
3
(B.34)
When πˆ1(z) ≥ (a−c)
2(1+4δ+pˆ(z)·ρ)
16(1+2δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) , the supplier’s optimal decision is
w∗∗2 =
{
a+c
2 − δ(a−c)2(1+2δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) , if δ < 1+pˆ(z)·ρ7
a+2c
3 , otherwise
(B.35)
When πˆ1(z) <
(a−c)2(1+4δ+pˆ(z)·ρ)
16(1+2δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) , the supplier’s optimal decision is w
II
2 if πS,2(w
II
2 ) > πS,2
(
a+2c
3
)
;
otherwise, the optimal decision is a+2c
3
.
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Best-Response Retail Price 4.
The best-response retail price for the entire problem for wII2 ≤ wI2 and wIII2 ≤ a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ is given as
as follows
p∗∗2 =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
a+w2
2 +
δ(w2−c)
2(1+δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) , if w2 < w
I
2
2w2 − c, if a+2c3 ≤ w2 ≤ wI2
a+w2
2 , if w2 <
a+2c
3
(B.36)
The supplier’s optimal decision is
w∗∗2 =
{
a+c
2
− δ(a−c)
2(1+2δ+pˆ(z)·ρ) , if δ <
1+pˆ(z)·ρ
7
a+2c
3 , otherwise
(B.37)
2.3 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
The lemma can be proved by direct comparison between the best response functions of Retailer 1 (in
(B.1)) and Retailer 2 (in (B.8), (B.29), (B.32), (B.34) and (B.36)).
Lemma 3. Retailer’s belief of Retailer 1’s proﬁt, πˆ1(z), is non-increasing in the wholesale price oﬀer
to Retailer 1, w1.
Proof. Consider two wholesale prices w1 and w1+Δ for Δ > 0. For the same noise level  and two signal
realizations, z = w1 +  and z1 = w1 + Δ + . In Retailer 2’s inferences, the sets of possible wholesale
price oﬀers are respectively [z− b, z + b] and [z1, z1+ b]. The posterior probability densities are the same
except that the one under z1 is shifted to the right, i.e., p(z + κ) = p(z1 + κ) for κ = −b,−b + 1, . . . , b.
Suppose z+ κˆ is the highest oﬀer acceptable to Retailer 1 according Retailer 2’s belief (i.e., u1(z+ κˆ) > 0
and u1(z + κˆ+1) ≤ 0). For small enough Δ > 0, z1 + κˆ is also the highest oﬀer acceptable to Retailer 1
in Retailer 2’s inference for the signal z1. Therefore, according Retailer 2’s belief, the acceptable oﬀers
for the signal z and z1 are [z − b, z + κˆ] and [z1− b, z1 + κˆ], respectively. Note that according Lemma 2,
π1(z + κ) ≥ π1(z1 + κ) for κ = −b,−b + 1 . . . , κˆ. Thus, the expected proﬁts upon acceptance according
to Retailer 2’s inferences are such that πˆ1(z) ≥ πˆ1(z1). In other words, πˆ1(z) is non-increasing in w1.
Lemma 4. When the supplier is faced with two retailers and makes wholesale price oﬀers sequentially,
the optimal price oﬀer to Retailer 1, w∗∗1 , conditional upon Retailer 2’s acceptance and choosing p∗∗2 , is
lower than the optimal wholesale price oﬀer, w∗1 = w
∗
i , made by the supplier when she makes these oﬀers
simultaneously (see Section 2.3).
Proof. Note that any wholesale price oﬀer w1 that is higher than w∗1 in (2.3) reduces the supplier’s
proﬁt from Retailer 1. Thus we only need to show that a higher price also lower the supplier’s proﬁt
from Retailer 2. Note that w1 aﬀects the Retailer 2’s response and consequently the supplier’s proﬁt
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through pˆ(z) and πˆ1(z). Consider w∗1 in eq. (2.3) and a wholesale price oﬀer w1 = w
∗
1 + Δ, and for
the same noise , the signal realizations are z = w∗1 +  and z1 = w∗1 + Δ + . Note that z1 = z + Δ,
then in Retailer 2’s inference, the set of possible wholesale prices under the actual wholesale price w1
(i.e., [z1 − b, z1 + b]) is shifted to the right by Δ relative to the set of wholesale prices under the actual
value of w∗ (i.e., [z− b, z + b]). Thus the probability of acceptance under z1 can not be larger than that
under z because a higher wholesale price results in a lower proﬁt and utility for Retailer 1 according
to Lemma 2. Furthermore, by Lemma 3, the expected proﬁt upon acceptance πˆ1(z1) is no more than
πˆ1(z). Therefore, for any common noise  and a positive Δ, a wholesale price w1 = w∗ + Δ leads
to pˆ(z1) ≤ pˆ(z) and πˆ1(z1) ≤ πˆ1(z). Furthermore, for any given w2, the Retailer 2’s best responses
in eq. (B.8) and eq. (B.29), (B.32), (B.34) and (B.36) under the actual values of w∗1 , w1 = w
∗
1 + Δ
and a common noise , are such that p∗2(w2, z1) ≥ p∗2(w2, z). As a result, the supplier’s proﬁts are
(a− p2(w2, z1)) (w2 − c) ≤ (a− p2(w2, z)) (w2 − c). Therefore, for each possible noise , any wholesale
price oﬀer above w∗1 results in a lower proﬁt than w
∗
1. The optimal wholesale price to Retailer 1 thus is
not higher than w∗1 .
Lemma 5. When the supplier is faced with two retailers and makes wholesale price oﬀers sequentially,
the optimal wholesale price oﬀer to Retailer 2, w∗∗2 , conditional upon Retailer 2’s acceptance and choosing
p∗∗2 , is higher than the optimal wholesale price oﬀer, w∗1 = w∗i , when the supplier makes these oﬀers
simultaneously (see Section 2.3).
Proof. Since the optimal wholesale price to Retailer 2 has closed-form expression, a direct comparison
is suﬃcient to show that the optimal wholesale prices in Appendix 2.1 and 2.2 are all (weakly higher)
than the one shown in (2.3).
Proof of Proposition 1
When only distributional fairness matters, Retailer i’s best-response retail price in identical to eq. (B.1).
Substituting (B.1) into the objective function πS,i = (a− pi)(wi − c), we have
πS,i =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(
a−wi
2 − δ(wi−c)2(1+δ)
)
(wi − c), if wi ≥ a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ
(a− 2wi + c)(wi − c), a+2c3 ≤ wi < a(1+δ)+c(2+δ)3+2δ
(a−wi)(wi−c)
2 , if wi <
a+2c
3
(B.38)
This objective function is piece-wise concave. The optimal solution can found by comparing the optimal
values in each interval. Moreover, under the optimal wholesale price, the best-response retail price (B.1)
always gives Retailer i a positive utility and he always accepts.
Proof of Proposition 2
When ρ = 0, the model reduces to the model with distributional fairness, and both retailers have positive
utilities and accept the wholesale price oﬀers as shown in the proof of Proposition 1 above. When ρ > 0,
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Retailer 2’s utility is negatively aﬀected by ρ · pˆ(z)[max{πˆ1(z) − π2, 0}]. Suppose Retailer 2 chooses
best-response retail price p∗∗2 , then this best-response retail price can lead to a negative utility when ρ
is arbitrarily large. For the optimal wholesale price w∗∗2 , the maximum value of peer-induced fairness
parameter ρ¯ with which Retailer 2 incurs a non-negative utility can be found by solving u2 (p∗∗2 (w∗∗2 )) = 0
for ρ. When ρ is not too large, i.e., ρ < ρ¯, Retailer 2 accepts his wholesale price oﬀer w∗∗2 , and Retailer 1
accepts his wholesale price oﬀer w∗∗1 because w∗∗1 is more attractive than the one without peer-induced
fairness concern (by Lemma 4 w∗∗1 ≤ w∗i ). The comparison between w∗∗1 and w∗∗2 follows directly by
combining Lemmas 4 and 5 above.
Proof of Proposition 3
Following the proof of Proposition 2 above, when ρ is not too large, i.e., ρ < ρ¯, both retailers accept their
wholesale price oﬀers and choose best-response retailer prices. Since we have derived best-response retail
prices in closed-from, the proof of this proposition follows direct comparisons of the retailers proﬁts.
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